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 This thesis explores the implications of Hegel’s remark in §31 of Encyclopedia 
Logic that the Greeks thought freely while moderns are bound to presuppositions. Plato is 
today generally regarded as the originator of the a priori, yet Hegel’s reading of Plato 
exempts him from what he sees as a distinctly modern tendency towards presupposition. 
Hegel sees Platonic presuppositions as self-mediating and ultimately self-canceling in the 
flow of thought. Modern philosophy, by contrast, aims to establish an unshakable first 
principle external to and exempt from thoughtful reflection. This radical disjunction 
between Greek and modern philosophy can be best seen in Plato’s aporetic moment. 
Plato opted to allow the bewilderment of aporia at the same crucial juncture of thought 
where we moderns buttress our challenged definitions upon an a priori presupposition. 
This aporetic moment arises when thought, still stuck in its first moment of abstraction, 
realizes that it cannot rigorously define crucial philosophical concepts. In the aporia Plato 
exposes the pretensions of those who believe that the good can be defined. Hegel 
likewise critiques the overreach of the modern understanding (Verstand) in attempting to 
directly predicate the highest philosophical concepts. This thesis draws out each thinker’s 
descriptions of the circumstances and presuppositions surrounding the aporetic moment 
and closely correlates them, ultimately showing why Hegel regarded Greek thought as so 
radically misunderstood by his contemporaries. Looking at the movement of his thought 
and not its static conclusions, Hegel reads Plato as a dialectical antidote to the hubris of 
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As concerns thinking freely, Greek philosophy thought freely, but not 
scholasticism, since the latter likewise took up its content as something given and, 
indeed, given by the Church. – We moderns, through our entire way of education 
[unsere ganze Bildung], have been initiated into representations [Vorstellungen] 
[of things], which it is exceptionally difficult to overcome because these 
representations possess the deepest content [den tiefsten Inhalt]. Regarding the 
ancient philosophers we must imagine human beings who stand entirely within 
sensory perception and have no other presupposition than the heaven above and 
the earth around them, since mythological representations had been discarded. In 
this factual environment, thought is free and withdrawn into itself, free from 
anything material, purely with itself. This kind of being purely with itself [reine 
Beisichsein] is inherent in free thought, sailing off into the free, open space where 
there is nothing below or above us, and where we stand in solitude alone with 
ourselves.1 
 
The evocative image of the Greek mind setting off into the world in full self-possession 
expresses the profound influence of ancient thought upon Hegel’s system. Whatever 
philosophical advances we moderns have achieved, we fall short of the Greeks because 
we limit ourselves by beginning to philosophize from a set of preconditions foreign to 
thought itself. Modern philosophy proceeds from an unphilosophical dependence upon 
what remains external to thoughtful consideration. While the Greek mind strode forward 
to meet the world on its own terms, the modern mind tethers itself to an a priori 
foundation, a starting point which grounds all subsequent thought while being itself 
exempt from thoughtful consideration. The modern takes an immediate self-evidence to 
be the cornerstone of all truth, while the Greek did not seek such an unspoiled beginning, 
celebrating the mediating process of thought as the sovereignty of the mind. 
 
1 G.W.F Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part 1: Science of 
Logic, trans. by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), §31, 71. 
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 To 21st century readers, Hegel’s wide generalizations about world-historical 
philosophical epochs seem vulnerable to obvious skeptical rejoinders. Well-known 
elements of Platonic philosophy seem to directly contradict each point of Hegel’s 
characterization of ancient thought. Plato compares sensory experience to being trapped 
inside a prison2 or an oyster shell,3 derives the immortality of the soul from the a priori 
existence of innate ideas,4 and often provides mythic representations of his ideas.5 Plato’s 
doctrine of recollected ideas has generally been read as the source of the very 
presuppositional attitude Hegel critiques. Martin Heidegger neatly summarized how the 
tradition has received Plato as establishing presuppositions (Voraus-setzungen) set in 
advance (im Vor-aus) of philosophical thought when he termed him “the discoverer of 
the a priori.”6 
 The dissonance between Hegel’s comments in EL and the general reception of 
Plato discloses a crucial intersection between Hegel’s interpretation of the history of 
philosophy and his understanding of what constitutes a presupposition restrictive of the 
free development of thought. In Hegel’s reading, it is we moderns who are guilty of 
anachronism in our abstract representational reading of Platonic philosophy, emphasizing 
 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, translations of Plato are from Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John 
Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). Republic 517b. 
 
3 Phaedrus 250c. 
 
4 Phaedo 73cff.  
 
5 As just one example, the seer Diotima reveals the nature of platonic love, personified as Eros, to 
Socrates. Symposium 210a–212b. 
 
6 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstader (Bloomington 
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982), §22, 326. 
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certain conclusions as “Platonic” while losing the truth of the whole — the free, self-
contained movement of philosophical thought. Tracing the dialogues through the 
immanent development Lawrence Bruce-Robertson terms “the journey to truth”, 7 Hegel 
reads Plato without presupposing in advance any “Platonic” conclusions. The a priori is 
not, as it were, posited a priori, but arrived at through this journey. Just as no part of 
Hegel’s system can be considered apart from the self-mediated development of the whole 
of thought, Plato’s recollected forms are not immediate representations of externalized 
ideas, but the motion of thought intensively realizing itself through the process of the 
philosophical education portrayed in the dialogues.8 
 Hegel sees the development of thought as occurring through three stages which he 
presents in the Encyclopedia Logic as the three sides of the logical domain: 1.) the 
abstract side or that of the understanding 2.) the dialectical or negatively rational side 3.) 
the speculative or positively rational side. The understanding is the first moment of 
thought which presumes its objects to have an abstract, self-sufficient identity, 
“distinguished and fixed as such [für sich] in this their isolation.”9 The overreaching 
predominance of this first method obscures our ability to distinguish these moments of 
 
7 Lawrence Bruce-Robertson, “The Platonic Dimension in Hegel’s System,” in Hegel and Ancient 
Philosophy: A Re-Examination, ed. by Glenn Alexander Magee (New York: Routledge, 2018), 76. 
 
8 Hegel accounts for the Platonic doctrine of recollection as part of this process of development. 
“When it is said in the Platonic philosophy that we recollect the ideas, this means that the ideas are 
undeveloped [an sich] in human beings and not (as the Sophists maintained) something foreign to human 
beings that comes to them from the outside. Yet through this construal of knowing as recollection the 
development of what is undeveloped in human beings is not ruled out, and this development is nothing but 
mediation.” EL §67, 117. 
 




thought while maintaining their unity. It attempts to separate and distinguish these 
moments as fully separable and distinguishable, but each of them are in fact “moments of 
every properly logical content.”10 Competent in the rigorous representational modeling of 
external objects but unable to give a reflexive account of thought itself, the understanding 
is always dependent upon the other moments of thought, just as they are equally 
dependent on the finite clarity of the understanding.   
 The modern fall into presupposition emerges from the premature attempt of the 
understanding to assert itself as independent. In his historical reflections in the 
preliminary conceptions (EL §26-§78), Hegel indicates how the history of Western 
philosophy since Descartes has been characterized by the dominance of the 
understanding, in which thought proceeds from the consciousness of an externalized 
object. In setting up a beginning for philosophy, the understanding proceeds from an 
external first principle, a truth not proceeding from the intensive development of thought, 
but true as given in some immediately self-evident sense. The abstract first principles of 
metaphysics (EL §26-§36), the reductive materialism of empiricism (EL §37-§39), the 
subject-object dualism of critical philosophy (EL §40-§60) and the direct appeal to 
immediate intellectual intuition (EL §61-§78) all posit some presupposition of thought 
which precludes it from developing on its own account. Moreover, the proponents of 
these modern doctrines have fallen into these presuppositions despite their adherence to 
the modern goal of establishing philosophy as an independent science. Each begins by 
 
10 EL §79, 125. 
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critiquing the presuppositions of its forebearers as arbitrary and dogmatic, only to be 
shown as equally so by its philosophical successor.  
 Hegel’s logic aims to end this tragicomic cycle by foregrounding the overreach of 
the understanding in each of these failed attempts at free thought as the critical 
preparation for establishing a philosophical system that is self-mediating and 
presuppositionless.11 In the course of modern thought, the understanding rightly attempts 
to eliminate its own presuppositions, but it can only replace one set of insufficient 
abstractions for another. It expresses an undeveloped universal which, being abstracted 
away as only for itself (für sich), is in fact indistinguishable from the isolated particulars 
it subsumes. 
The understanding’s activity generally consists in imparting the form of 
universality to its contents. More precisely, the universal posited by the 
understanding is an abstract universal which, as such, is maintained in opposition 
to the particular and by that very fact is determined at the same time to be itself a 
particular in turn.12  
 
This failure to grasp the true universal should be quite familiar to readers of Plato’s early 
aporetic dialogues. Unable to find a general definition suitable to the concepts they are 
investigating (piety in Euthyphro, courage in Laches, beauty in Hippias Major), Socrates 
and his interlocutors end their investigation without a definitive solution. Plato marks the  
 
11 As Miles Hentrup has argued, Hegel’s logic in fact requires some form of presupposition, as he 
does not aim to eliminate any sense of priority from his system. He indeed begins his logic from a definite 
starting point, the doctrine of being. But such beginnings are only warranted insofar as they cancel and 
eliminate themselves in the fuller development of the philosophical idea, partaking of “the self-mediating 
structure of absolute reality.” This sort of presupposition is not held over and against the rest of the system 
as an “external methodological requirement.” Miles Hentrup, “Hegel’s Logic as Presuppositionless 
Science”, Idealistic Studies 49, no.2 (2019): 146. 
 
12 EL §80, 126. 
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boundary of the understanding with an unceremonious perplexity, abruptly ending the 
naïve search for the universal by methods only capable of determining the particular. 
Aporetic moments in the early dialogues thus have a close affinity with Hegel’s critique 
of modern presupposition as arising from the overextension the understanding — it is 
precisely because Plato affirms and embraces the aporetic moment as a genuinely 
philosophical moment that he properly limits the role of the understanding. 
1.1 General outline 
 In the second chapter I will describe the content and form of thought in this first 
aporetic moment of thought for Plato and Hegel. Hegel sees the understanding (Verstand) 
as an abstracting form of thought which takes given representations (Vorstellungen) for 
its content. In Plato, this picture is somewhat more complicated. There is no distinctly 
Platonic or Socratic content and form of thought which ends in aporia, as Socrates to 
some extent mirrors the presuppositions of his interlocutors in the early dialogues. 
Socrates begins by engaging with the familiar content of Greek life, the common, 
obvious viewpoint of the proverbial man on the street, his doxa. Proceeding from this 
external content, thought reasons from given first principles, hypotheses, in a deductive 
mathematical form of reasoning, dianoia.  
 In the third chapter I will show how the aporetic moment arises when the 
understanding attempts to abstract a definition for fundamental concepts of the human 
and the divine (the good, the soul, God, etc.). Hegel critiques his modern predecessors for 
attempting to define the spiritual, the content of Geist, as if it could be reduced to a 
representation comprehensible through a predicating judgement. Socrates likewise 
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encourages his interlocutors to express their knowledge of ethical terms in rigorous 
definitions. These definitions do not stand up under the cross-examination of Socratic 
dialectic.  
 In the fourth chapter I will describe the aftermath of the failure of these attempts 
to directly define the absolute. Hegel describes the history of modern philosophy as a 
series of presuppositions each attempting to rectify the narrow dogmatism of the prior 
presupposition. By contrast, Plato lets the aporetic moment stand as a moment of genuine 
perplexity, transitioning into a second dialectical moment of thought. The aporia of the 
early dialogues demands that we move past the artificial solidity of doxa and reassess our 
representational presuppositions alongside the movement of thought. 
 In the fifth chapter I will integrate the voices of the two thinkers by considering a 
Hegelian response to the Euthyphro dilemma in which the causal presuppositions of the 
understanding give way to an appreciation of conceptual reciprocity.  
 Each chapter begins with the Hegelian account of the topic at hand followed by 
the Platonic account. The Platonic account will occasionally borrow language from the 
Hegelian account due to the greater unified simplicity of the Hegelian terms, which Hegel 
correlated to Platonic terms in his discussions of Plato. I will be working primarily from 
the Encyclopedia Logic in discussing Hegel, as it provides his most mature critique of the 
understanding while also outlining its historical preeminence in modern philosophy. 
While Hegel does discuss Plato in EL, I will also be heavily relying on his comments in 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Phenomenology of Mind supplies occasional 
illustrative examples. Finally, while the aporetic moment belongs most distinctly to the 
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early Platonic dialogues, it extends into the late dialogue Theaetetus. While dianoia, the 
abstract understanding, is operative throughout the early dialogues, it is best described in 
the divided line analogy of Republic.  
2. The content and form of thought in the aporetic moment 
2.1. Vorstellung and doxa 
2.1.1. Vorstellung 
 It is true to the spirit of Hegel’s logic to begin not with form, but with content. 
Hegel aims to circumvent the protracted disputes over epistemic method and justification 
— the forms of thought — which have dominated a scientifically influenced philosophy 
since the early modern period. These controversies concerning method have neglected to 
direct their critical attention towards the content of thought, which is taken as an 
immediately given representation (Vorstellung) of the external sensuous world, an inner 
mental image generated by a subject which abstracts and models its objects. The blind 
assumption of a representational content is fundamental presupposition of which the 
modern is guilty. As philosophy followed the natural sciences in the early modern period, 
it grew to regard its content as obvious and unworthy of critical reflection. As botanists 
study plants, philosophers dispute mental images. Yet the content of philosophy, the 
content of thought itself, is not at all self-evident. EL begins with the observation that 
philosophy, unique among the sciences, has no given content. Thought must begin with a 
representation, an immediate starting point external to thought itself, yet reflective, 
genuinely philosophical thought reflects upon and reconsiders this content.  
Philosophy lacks the advantage from which the other sciences benefit, namely the 
ability to presuppose both its objects as immediately endorsed by representation 
of them and an acknowledged method of knowing, which would determine its 
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starting-point and progression. […] consciousness produces for itself 
representations of objects prior to generating concepts [Begriffe] of them. What is 
more, only by passing through the process of representing and by turning towards 
it, does thinking spirit progress to knowing by way of thinking [denkendes 
Erkennen] and to comprehending [Begreifen] […] The difficulty of making a 
beginning, however, arises at once, since a beginning is something immediate and 
as such makes a presupposition, or rather it is itself just that.13 
 
Representations are not to be eliminated from thought, but rather are to be seen in 
reflection (Nachdenken) as a necessary entry point into discourse, a beginning which is 
not a self-sufficient given and vanishes upon mediation. The foundationalist attempts to 
dogmatically posit presuppositions which seem arbitrary and insufficient upon further 
reflective examination. An abstract representation, nothing more than a starting point, 
assumes the role of the fully developed concrete concept. A raw content has been taken 
for a finished product; a bare outline has been tasked with fleshing out and animating the 
living body; what is first and immediate has been taken as what must be final and 
complete. The German language brings out more directly the close relationship between 
presupposition and representational content — a representation is immediately placed 
before (Vor-stellung) consciousness, which in turn naively sets it ahead (Voraus-setzung) 
as a presupposition. What the foundationalist takes as the necessary foundational 
principles of thought only arise from an empty recursive circularity, taking the true as 
that to which we were first introduced (vorgestellt).14  
 Consciousness (Bewußtsein) takes an external object which it opposes to its own 
subjective being. This modern presupposition of subject/object opposition in 
 
13 EL §1, 28. 
 
14 Vorstellung can mean “introduction” as well as “representation” in German. 
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consciousness further underlies our dependence on a representational content. 
Objectification freezes the content of thought in an immediacy in which a certain form is 
presupposed as inherent in the content. 
In any one of these forms [above, “feeling, intuition, image”], or as a mixture of 
several of them, the content is the object of consciousness. In this objectification, 
it so happens that the determinacies of these forms convert themselves into part of 
the content, such that with each of these forms a specific object seems to arise, 
and, what is in itself the same, can take on the look of a different content.15 
 
Consciousness imbues its objects with a determining form, a form implied in their very 
objectification. This presupposed unity of objectified form and content is taken as an 
immediately given representation. Not yet internally reflective self-consciousness, 
consciousness understands thought to be an empty vessel before which is placed 
(vorgestellt) a content with a form supposed in advance (vorausgesetzt). All objects of 
inquiry are a something to be clarified as an immediate and definite object. Where a fully 
developed concept emerges in and through mental activity, a representation presents itself 
to consciousness as something complete on its own account, as if no formal activity of 
thought need be introduced. Consciousness takes representations to immediately reflect 
reality as a “mirror of nature.”16 It takes propositions as if they were brute facts, models 
as if they were realities.  
 If a representation is an unprocessed unity of form and content, it is natural that 
they are basic currency of social discourse. Since the representation is a transferrable 
object, a self-contained unit external to consciousness, social convention plays a pivotal 
 
15 EL §3, 30. 
 
16 This is the phrase coined by Richard Rorty in his critique of 20th century representationalism.  
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role in molding representations. When consciousness demands an intelligible content, it 
only demands what it is already well-known (geläufig) and self-evident (von selbst 
verstehen).17 Philosophy is precisely the process of unpacking these representations by 
thinking them over (Nachdenken). In Hegel’s example, thinking over a representation is 
analogous to learning the art of shoemaking after starting from nothing more than the 
mental image of the final product. Unlike the wearer of the shoe, the shoemaker does not 
immediately accept shoe as a given, obvious unity of form and content, but rather 
actively participates in its formation. The philosopher is more like this shoemaker than 
like the consumer of the shoe. The shoemaker, like any trained expert, is immanently 
involved in their discipline and does not take its content as a prefabricated object.18  
 Hegel describes a wide range of phenomenal content as representational, 
including feelings, intuitions, and images. Representations thus conflate an immediate 
sensuous engagement with the world with thought, which is always a mediation 
irreducible to such concrete expression. A representational content attempts to present the 
universal in concrete immediacy, but in so attempting to make the abstract immediately 
comprehensible, it only succeeds in producing a still more abstract content. As will be 
further discussed below, a definition is one attempt to give a concrete representation of 
the universal. Representational definitions present only an abstract formality of an initial 
mental presentation, a Vorstellung wholly inadequate to the concrete object of definition. 
Hegel describes the inadequacy of such apparently concrete definitions in his discussion 
 
17 EL §3, 31. 
 
18 EL §5, 32. 
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of the understanding’s misplaced confidence in mathematical definitions as a self-evident 
content, 
At this point, it should also be noted that in philosophy we are not at all concerned 
merely with correct definitions, much less with merely plausible definitions, i.e. 
definitions whose correctness is immediately obvious to representational 
consciousness. When quantity is taken up directly from representation without 
being mediated by thinking, it easily happens that quantity is overestimated with 
respect to its scope and even raised to an absolute category. This is indeed the 
case when only those sciences whose objects can be submitted to a mathematical 
calculus are recognized as exact sciences. Our knowing would indeed be in bad 
shape, if, renouncing exact knowledge, we generally had to be satisfied merely 
with a vague representation of such objects as freedom, law, the ethical life, even 
God himself, merely because they cannot be measured and calculated or 
expressed in a mathematical formula.19 
 
Just as in the presentation of sense certainty at the outset of Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
what seems to be most concrete turns out to be, upon reflection, the most abstract and 
empty. Definitions give the initial impression of ensuring that we work with concrete 
terms, but meaningful philosophical concepts only become hopelessly abstract and 
indeterminate when reduced to a definitional representation. In the representational 
education of modernity, we demand that truth be made accessible to mathematics for it to 
qualify as definite and tangible, and yet a mathematical rendering is still a further 
abstraction from the concrete concept. While representation takes many forms, its basic 
and most directly etymological sense arises from its re-presentation of the concrete whole 
through an abstract model, often but not necessarily mathematical.  
 




 Plato’s Socrates introduces a reflective principle in opposition to the sophists, 
who are ready and eager to justify the conventional representations (doxai) of Greek 
society. Socrates differentiates his approach to teaching from that of the sophists, though 
both “believe in education as the key to all social and political problems.”20 The sophists 
understand education as instruction in an external object of knowledge, a representational 
doxa, capable of direct transfer from student to pupil. Socrates challenges this model of 
education in representations with the doctrine of recollection in Meno, as he demonstrates 
that learning is not merely an imposition of content from outside of mind, but rather the 
development of a potential already within it.21 Socrates does not educate in passively 
received doxai, but in concepts which both stimulate and require the active participation 
of his pupils.  
 Plato makes this critique of the sophists most directly in Book 7 of Republic. 
While true education turns the soul towards the good, sophistic education mechanically 
“put[s] knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes.”22 Hegel 
quotes this passage from Plato in LHP and then outlines where this sophistic approach to 
education can be observed in modernity, 
The idea that knowledge comes entirely from without is in modern times found in 
empirical philosophies of a quite abstract and rude kind, which maintain that 
everything that man knows of the divine nature comes as a matter of education 
and habituation, and that mind is thus a quite indeterminate potentiality merely. 
Carried to an extreme, this is the doctrine of revelation in which everything is 
 
20 G.B. Kerferd, The sophistic movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1981), 138. 
 
21 Meno 82ff. 
 
22 Republic 518b-c.  
Saad 16 
 
given from without. In the Protestant religion we do not find this rude idea [diese 
rohe Vorstellung] in its abstract form, for the witness of the spirit is an essential 
part of faith, i.e. faith demands that the individual subjective spirit shall on its 
own account accept and set forth the determination which comes to it in the form 
of something given from without. 23 
 
While the subjective principle of inner development (an idea originating in Plato himself) 
has moderated the most extreme doctrines of an external given, representation 
nonetheless persists as the primary philosophical content of moderns. The disagreement 
between Plato and the sophists about the nature of education as coming from within or 
from without is thus, for modern readers, an extreme case that clarifies what is today 
disputed with more nuance. Hegel alleges that moderns ground external representations 
on abstract foundations, mediating mental content through a general formal principle. 
The sophists, by contrast, lack any principle of mental determination whatsoever; 
whatever is in mind is what has been implanted there. Plato’s critique of the sophists is 
thus a critique of representationalism in its most pure, naïve form. 
 Doxa has often been translated as “opinion” in English translations of Greek 
philosophy, but recent scholarship has demonstrated how this translation is inaccurate 
and misleading, and likely proceeds from an overly epistemological reading of Plato. The 
conflict between epistēmē and doxa has long been seen as a conflict between exact and 
inexact forms of knowledge, between “science” and “opinion”. Yet while Plato certainly 
sees epistēmē as a more developed form of knowledge than doxa, this development 
should not be conceived solely in terms of the modern epistemic concern for the accuracy 
 
23 While Plato does not name names, Hegel identifies the sophists as the source of this doctrine. 




and validity of propositions. As Sean Kirkland has pointed out, doxa is simply the 
nominal form of the verb dokeō, which can mean to opine, but has a still earlier meaning 
of “to seem, to appear”, denoting the activity of an external phenomenon which makes an 
impression upon the mind.24 Doxa unifies a given external content with a loosely 
presupposed, merely opined subjective principle of thought, resulting in a premature 
unity of form and content correlating very closely with the Hegelian sense of a 
representation. Doxa so conceived also arises primarily from social prejudice, which 
filters everything that appears through the conventional beliefs of the polis. In Kirkland’s 
phenomenological rendering, doxai inevitably reflect the Heideggerian “world”,  
If I have a doxa about virtue, then, this is not an always potentially misfiring 
attempt to reach out and lay hold of ‘what virtue is.’ Rather, it is in the first 
instance an appearance of ‘what virtue is’ that have received from the outside, 
from the world. Indeed, we must recognize here the absence of precisely that 
radical separation which holds apart our modern binaries, ‘inside-outside’ and 
‘subject-object,’ for what is ‘on the inside,’ opinion, is originally understood as 
always already connected to and revealing of, to some extent, what is ‘on the 
outside,’ and it is named accordingly.25 
 
While Kirkland sees the dissolution of internal and external distinctions in doxa as 
tending towards a phenomenological reading of the early dialogues, Hegel would find 
 
24 “Doxa is a noun derived from the verb dokein, for which the Greek lexicon gives two equally 
common and interestingly opposed meanings. Dokein, in the active voice, means ‘to expect, think, suppose, 
imagine; to have an opinion, opine.’ However, the verb can also mean, still in the active voice, ‘to seem, 
appear: to appear to be something.’ Thus, dokein has a unique double valence— either the subject or the 
object in the epistemological relation can serve as the grammatical subject of this verb in the active voice. 
In the relation of the world to human experience or thought, dokein names both the subject’s action toward 
the object (‘ think, suppose, imagine that “x”’) and no less the object’s self-presentation to the subject (‘“x” 
seems, appears to me’). Even more crucial, the latter meaning seems to be the more original of the two, for 
we find that the verb dokein is linked to the deponent verb dechesthai, as its iterative form, indicating 
repetition. Dechesthai means with respect to things, ‘to take, accept, receive,’ and with respect to people, 
‘to welcome.’” Sean D. Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato's Early Dialogues 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 24-25. 
 
25 Kirkland, 25. 
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this reading to be too immediately accepting of the unity of inner mental assessment and 
outer phenomenal content presented in a representation, which must be broken down in 
reflective thought. Nonetheless, Kirkland’s non-epistemological interpretation shows 
how doxa, the initial content examined in the Socratic dialogues, is the Greek precursor 
of modern Vorstellungen. In the first instance, thought begins unable to distinguish 
between what is given and what arises from its own activity. It proceeds from the 
immediate, unconsidered, socially determined doxai which Plato overturned in his 
critique of the sophists. 
 The method of questioning Socrates employs in dismantling doxai is well-known 
and will be addressed further below, but what is less obvious is how the sophistic sense 
of education is an education in the representational content of doxa. In the later dialogue 
Theaetetus, Plato, perhaps now more deeply understanding the sophistic method, has 
Socrates give a sympathetic account of Protagoras’ views on education even as he 
critiques his thesis that perception (aisthēsis) is knowledge. It is worth noting how this 
thesis requires that knowledge come into the knower from an external source; Socratic 
self-knowledge, the soul’s knowledge of itself as a spiritual content, would be an 
impossibility on a purely perceptual account. As is also repeatedly shown in the early 
dialogues, one cannot have knowledge of nonsensible objects, like moral virtues, from 
perceptions. 
 Moreover, it is not clear how one can be educated in perceptions, which seem to 
be self-evident and not mediated by any principle of thought or training, and thus require 
no education. Perception is an immediate, incontestable experience, yet Protagoras 
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nevertheless insists that the human being should be subject to the mediating, improving 
process of education. These apparently incompatible views are only coherent when we 
realize that Protagoras has a radically externalized sense of education. In contrast with the 
Socratic attempt to draw out (e-ducere) the inner knowledge of his pupils, the sophistic 
teacher replaces uneducated representational doxai with better ones. As the learner only 
receives external representations, it makes as little sense to praise or blame him for his 
wisdom as it would to praise or blame health or sickness.26 Thinking is not sovereign, and 
so it does not fall to each individual to care for state of his own soul, the precept which 
Socrates advances as his fundamental ethical teaching.27 
 Socrates, expositing Protagoras’ views, shows how his sophistic doctrine of 
education treats the activity of learning how to think as nothing more than passively 
receiving better impressions. Doxai are objectified and transferred to students like 
medical drugs, administered by a teacher who understands them to be the better doxai for 
the health of the learner. 
So then indeed, in education [paideia], the aim is to effect a change from a worse 
condition into a better. And just as the doctor brings about such changes by drugs 
[pharmakois], the sophist does so by his words [logois]. And he does not change 
someone imagining falsity [pseudē doxazonta] into someone later thinking the 
truth [alēthē doxazonta]. For it is not possible to receive a representation 
[doxasai] of things that are not or indeed of anything other than what one feels at 
once [paschē] — for these things are always true.28 
 
 
26 Theaetetus 167a. 
 
27 “For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among you not to care for 
your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state of your soul.” Apology 
30a-b. 
 
28 This is my own translation which aims at bringing out the sense of external, immediate sense of 
doxa. Theaetetus 167a-b. 
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The doctrine is confusing because it relies on the conflation of the two senses of doxa 
Kirkland has noted — the generally accepted sense of doxa as an inexact judgement or 
opinion and the passive, phenomenal sense of receiving an external content. The sophist 
does not profoundly impact the judgements of his students in the sense of changing their 
thinking, does not bring them to turn from true doxai to false — this would be a Socratic 
education which provides for the self-mediation of the soul. When the sophists influence 
doxai, they aim to do so in the second, phenomenal sense of the word — to administer 
different impressions the learner who will receive them as a new content. In this 
overlooked second sense of the word, doxazein is the passive reception of an already 
complete content. Doxazein is ultimately paschein, a feeling pass-ively effected from an 
external source. These feelings are always true, as truth and falsity could only pertain to 
the judgements of an active mind which assesses this pure phenomenal content by its own 
independent formal principle.  
 And yet education aims to turn the soul from a worse condition to a better, a task 
for which the incontestable content of our immediate experience is clearly insufficient. 
The instruction of the sophistic teacher turns the soul towards better things through words 
(logois), understood as drugs (pharmaka). The student receives a better representation 
containing the immanent formal principle of a better judgement. These educative 
representations would be better in a moral and political sense, tending towards civic 
virtue, as this is the chief concern of Protagoras, who holds that the art of the sophists is 
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necessary for the maintenance of a civil, democratic state.29 Protagoras deems the wise 
man to be one who, by supplanting inferior logoi with better, “works a change and makes 
good things appear and be [phainesthai te kai einai] for him.”30 Education changes what 
appears as good to the student, who in turn makes different judgements about the good, 
which, in turn, brings about the good in the world. It is a pharmakon which accomplishes 
the fantastic feat of actively bringing about a better society through its passive reception 
in the soul of the student. 
 While this account of education seems mechanistic and neglectful of inner life, it 
is a clear account of how a certain form of education can discourage the independence of 
the mind and replicate the given content of social prejudice. Just as modern philosophers 
rely on presuppositions to support a representational content, the sophists depended upon 
the presuppositions of Greek society to evaluate doxai as better or worse. Protagoras, 
regarded by Plato as the most sincere of the sophists, styled himself as the champion and 
teacher of conventional Greek public life, and he proclaims that city to be just in which a 
better convention (nomos) maintains itself.31 The great wealth of many sophists was won 
by appealing to the orthodoxy of common Greek political and moral assessments in such 
a way that would be persuasive to juries. Yet this form of sophistic presupposition is not 
a presupposition in the modern sense, as the sophists, unlike moderns, did not claim to be 
 
29 The myth of how Zeus distributed the political virtues to humanity because it lacked the means 
for animal survival. Protagoras 320d-323a 
 
30 Theaetetus 166d.  
 




able to demonstrate the absolute necessity of their way of thought. The “in itself” is a 
discovery of Platonic philosophy, and the sophists were perfectly content with assessing 
representations as being better “for self” or “for the polis.” Hegel remarks that the 
sophists did not engage in thinking (Denken) so much as in reasoning (räsonierend),32 
and reasoning does not fall into presupposition because it simply does not attempt to 
ground itself, but always proceeds from an external given. The sophists recognized the 
caprice involved in their representational mode of education and exulted in their almost 
magical ability to change, in a single act of speech, the impressions and judgements of an 
audience. The content appropriate to their reasoning is nonetheless inappropriate for 
absolute science (epistēmē), an insufficiency critiqued in Plato but obscured by centuries 
of focus on his disagreement with the sophists as a conflict about epistemic method and 
not psychic content.  
2.1.3. Summation 
 While the correlation between Vorstellung and doxa is subject to the inherent 
difficulties in comparing ideas from two different periods of intellectual history, they 
share the following characteristics crucial to their role as the content of thought in the 
aporetic moment: 
1. They are an abstracted perceptual content given over to consciousness as external 
and prior to its own subjective thought. 
 
32 “The statement that the Sophists thereby fell into one-sided principles rests upon the fact that in 
Greek culture the time had not yet come when, out of thinking consciousness itself, the ultimate principles 
had become manifested, and thus there was something firm to rest upon, as is the case with us in modern 
times. Because, on the one hand, the need of subjective freedom existed merely to give effect to that which 
man himself perceives and finds present in his reason (thus laws, religious ideas, only in so far as I 
recognize them through my thought), on the other hand, no fixed principle had so far been found in 
thought; thought was rather reasoning [so war das Denken mehr räsonierend], and what remained 
indeterminate could thus only be fulfilled through self-will.” LHP I, 365. 
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2. As self-contained (für sich) objects implicitly containing their formal principle, 
they are presented directly to thought in their immediacy, not requiring any 
further mediation in thought. 
3. As self-contained objects implicitly containing their formal principle, they 
represent the concrete whole as a limited abstraction immediately accessible to 
consciousness.  
4. As limited abstractions from the concrete whole, they can be expressed through 
definitional propositions, mental images or models, and generalized conventional 
judgements. 
5. Spuriously concrete, they only mark the starting point of independent thought. If 
not further developed, they implicate thought in an inescapable dependence on 
external presuppositions. 
 
2.2.Verstand and dianoia 
2.2.1. Verstand 
 Hegel says of the understanding in EL,  
Thinking as understanding does not budge beyond the firm determinateness 
[Bestimmtheit] [of what is entertained] and its distinctness [Unterschiedenheit] 
over against others. A limited abstraction of this sort counts for it as self-standing 
and [as having] being [als für sich bestehend und seiend].33 
 
Through the understanding, the abstract determinations contained within a representation 
yield a content that is definite (bestimmt) and differentiated (unterschieden), standing for 
itself (für sich bestehend) as coherent and independent. The representational content is 
shown to obey the classical logic of non-contradiction. Yet non-contradiction alone is not 
sufficient even for the understanding. Hegel notes that the excluded middle is a principle 
already familiar to the Greek authors of sophistic paradoxes, whose riddles rested on the 
common-sensical presumption “that one of opposites is true, the other false; that a 
 




statement is either true or not true; that an object cannot have two opposite predicates.”34 
To consider a brief example: Every man must be either known or unknown to us. If he 
wears a mask, he must be unknown. But what if he is in fact our father? Do not know our 
father if he wears a mask?35  Left to its own resources, non-contradiction finds paradoxes 
in every equivocal use of language. For representations to remain coherent they must also 
be universal and thus fully abstracted away from the local paradoxes of sophists. Hegel 
sees non-contradiction and universality as principles of thought arising together in the 
Platonic dialogues.36 Thought resolves the ambiguity in representations in order to 
establish the paradigmatic genus abstracted from any particular sense datum.  
 Yet this abstract universal stands in tension with the full expression of its concrete 
particulars, as it has only made explicit and rationalized the presuppositions inherent in 
the initial representation. As the content is not free to determine itself in any way 
contradictory to these representational presuppositions, this universal stands in a one-
sided opposition to its particulars insofar as they are not fully determined by the 
abstraction of the understanding. When the understanding attempts to think the universal, 
it only thinks of the universal qua representational particular — the particular 
representation recast as in its abstract identity. Thought remains dependent on the given 
 
34 LHP I, 459. See also Richard Dien Winfield, “On Contradiction,” in Hegel and Ancient 
Philosophy: A Re-Examination, ed. by Glenn Alexander Magee (New York: Routledge, 2018), 147-160. 
 
35 This is a restatement of the masked man paradox of Eubulides, who guides Hegel’s discussion 
in the above passage of LHP. 
 
36 Hegel continues, “[The principle of the excluded middle] stands in close connection with the 
principle of Socrates and Plato (supra, pp. 455, 456), ‘The true is the universal;’ which is abstractly the 




representation for its content, failing to achieve the self-developed independence of 
thought necessary to think the true universal. As noted above,37 the understanding 
proceeds like the interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues, mistaking the universal for a 
more abstracted representation of the particular. 
 As the understanding attempts to universalize through abstraction, it takes the 
abstracted representation as the representation in its final, absolute form. This abstraction 
aims at a true philosophical content, but Hegel sees this method as merely reductive and 
bound to end in the irresolvable dualism between form and content characteristic of 
modern thought. While speculative thought moves towards the concrete universal, the 
true infinity immanent within the manifold of particulars, the understanding substitutes an 
immediate abstraction for a fully developed concept. This error is as prevalent as it is 
pernicious. As the understanding dominates modern thought, the substitution of the 
abstract for the concrete universal is widely accepted.  Even in everyday speech the 
abstract is widely conflated with the universal,38 saddling thought with the “perverted 
presupposition [verkehrte Voraussetzung]” of its own activity as a merely formal analysis 
of representations.39 This formal analysis takes the fixed abstract identity of 
 
37 EL §80, 126. 
 
38 “Even the word ‘absolute’ has itself frequently no further meaning than that of ‘abstract’; thus, 
absolute space, absolute time means nothing further than abstract space and abstract time.” EL §115, 178. 
 
39 “All those reproaches so frequently made against thinking, namely, from the standpoint of 
sentiment and immediate intuition, reproaches of one-sidedness, rigidity, emptiness, and so forth are 
grounded in the perverted presupposition that the activity of thinking is only that of abstractly positing 
identity, and it is formal logic itself that confirms this presupposition by setting up the allegedly highest law 
of thinking, illumined in the above section. If thinking were nothing more than that abstract identity, then it 
would have to be declared the most superfluous and most boring business.” EL §115, 179. 
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determinations as unquestionably true, immediate and obvious in a tautological sense and 
exclusive of any inner difference within the determination itself. 
Formal identity or identity of the understanding is this identity insofar as one 
fastens on it and abstracts from the difference. Or the abstraction is rather the 
positing of this formal identity, the transformation of something in itself concrete 
into this form of simplicity – be it that a part of the manifold on hand in what is 
concrete is omitted (through so-called analysing) and only one of the manifold 
parts is taken up or that, with the omission of its diversity, the manifold 
determinations are pulled together [zusammengezogen] into one.40 
 
The manifold, the true infinity, is brusquely reduced to an insufficient unity, the 
immediately comprehensible object of representational content. If the human being 
contains an infinite manifold of determinations, the understanding must (whatever the 
specifics of its formal operations) define it through one single simple determination — a 
determining predicate like “rational animal.” Yet the very distinction of this predicate 
from its subject undermines abstract identity’s presumption of equating the identical.41 
Besides all the other infinitely determinable qualities of the human being, the opposite, 
negative predicate may equally obtain. The human being, as the only animal capable of 
rationality, is also the only irrational animal. The empty form of one-sided determination 
erases the rich, concrete content it intends to represent. While Hegel is not the first to 
offer such a critique of thought,42 he contextualizes this insufficiency as a limitation of 
 
40 EL §115, 177. 
 
41 “The form of the sentence [Form des Satzes] already contradicts it itself since a sentence also 
promises a difference between subject and predicate, but this sentence does not accomplish what its form 
requires.” EL §115, 178. 
 
42 Hegel echoes the critical philosophy, for which the categories unify the phenomena but, as 




just one moment of thought, of the understanding, which takes as absolute the immediate 
formal equivalencies of abstract identity.  
A genealogy of the understanding 
 Hegel provides a comprehensive narrative about the history of medieval and 
modern philosophy in which the understanding comes to dominate philosophy. This 
genealogy sharply differentiates the dependent thought of modernity from the free 
thought of antiquity. The understanding becomes the default and exclusive mode of 
philosophizing in the middle ages, when thought was taken to be entirely dependent on 
an external content — the revealed truth of Catholic doctrine. Petrarch, emerging from 
this medieval world, shows the clear relationship between Christianity and modern 
philosophical foundationalism when he describes the Christian religion as “the highest 
stronghold of truth to which all must be referred; an unshakeable foundation [immobili 
fundamento] of true literature upon which human effort may safely build.”43  
 With this presupposition of a Christian foundation, thought now becomes the 
circular justification of presupposed doctrine, an education in representations which 
deeply distorted Western philosophy’s ability to distinguish between a given content and 
the formal principle of thought. Thought was asked to justify the presuppositions of 
theology, the study of the absolute, through the finite, sensuous content of the 
understanding. A non-sensuous, spiritual content was taken as a fully determinable 
object, resulting in theological representations which wantonly packaged sensuous 
 
43 ad quod velut ad summam veri arcem referenda sunt omnia; cui tanquam uni literarum verarum 
immobili fundamento, tuto superedificat humanus labor. Petrarch, Familiarum Rerum 6.2.4. 
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content with theological speculation. This confusion resulted in confused, self-defeating 
approach to philosophy which furnished satirical material for humanist reformers.  
Additional examples of quæstiones of this kind are given by those who ridiculed 
such dialectic, for instance by Erasmus in his Encomium moriæ: “Could there be 
several sonships (filiationes) in Christ? Is the proposition possible that God the 
Father hates the Son? Might God not have also taken the form of a woman, or 
have passed into the devil? Might He not also have appeared in the form of an ass 
or of a pumpkin? In what manner would the pumpkin have preached and wrought 
miracles, and how would it have been crucified?” Thus were intellectual 
determinations combined and distinguished in a manner altogether without sense 
or thought. The main point is that the Scholastics were like barbarians in their 
way of handling divine things and bringing them into sensuous determinations 
and relations. They thus introduced a completely sensuous rigidity and these 
altogether external and senseless forms into the purely spiritual, thus bringing it to 
a lower and unspiritual level […] This barbarous use of the understanding is 
utterly irrational; it is like putting a golden necklace on a sow.44 
 
Having reduced the absolute to a comically sensuous representation, the understanding 
can only operate in the detached abstraction of scholastic disputation. The technique and 
form of argument compensates for its lack of determinate content, as in Anselm’s famous 
proof of God, which proves that God exists, but only God conceived in the most general 
abstraction, as “the greatest possible being.” The unassailable formal rigor of the proof 
obscures the complete lack of determinate content in the concept of God so proved.  
 It is worth appreciating the habits of thought which arose in this time because 
modern philosophy continues to fall into the same pattern of presupposition established 
when the scholastics set philosophy on the course of presupposing and justifying 
theological content. The early modern metaphysics which began with Descartes sought a 
new secular presupposition from which to proceed, and it found this in the thinking 
 
44 LHP III, 89-90. 
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consciousness of subjectivity itself, the understanding which determines sensual 
representations through abstract predication. While this foundational status of the 
understanding as a first principle allowed for the development of natural science, it 
quickly confronted the fact that its one-sided predications were entirely insufficient to 
objects outside of natural science. 
The old metaphysics was thus interested in knowing whether predicates of the 
kind mentioned could be attributed to objects. However, these predicates are 
limited determinations of the understanding that express only a barrier and not 
what is true. – In this context it also needs to be specifically noted how its way of 
proceeding consisted in attributing [beigelegt] predicates to the object to be 
known, such as God, for instance. This, however, represents an external reflection 
about the object since the determinations (the predicates) are ready-made [fertig] 
in my representation and attributed to the object in an external manner only.45 
 
The understanding externalizes itself from its object and presupposes the final product of 
knowledge as a one-sided predication of an external object. It does not think the object so 
much as label it through the resolution of predicates presupposed to be in a mutually 
exclusive opposition to each other. Even if a content such as the soul shows itself to 
contain contradictory predicates, to be at once one and many, the understanding must 
follow the scholastic method of one-sidedly resolving the confusion and determining its 
object as exclusively one or the other. Artificially reducing the object to an insufficient 
predicate, the understanding remains an external spectator who only appends its own 
presupposed predicates to the object of thought, laying them at its side (bei-legen).  
 However much the spirit of Enlightenment has substituted the secular 
presupposition of a transcendental subjective consciousness for that of religious dogma, 
 
45 EL §28, 69. 
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the same shortcomings of the understanding persist. While the medieval paradoxes of a 
predicable God are today less disputed, consciousness, the seat of the understanding, 
remains a mystery to itself, irreducible to the propositional and empirical methodologies 
of analytic philosophy, the heir to this method. When the understanding turns reflexively 
inward towards the content of Geist, towards emotion and thought, it can only reduce 
itself to something unrecognizably insufficient. Nonetheless, the understanding succeeds 
in clarifying the generality of representations into definite propositions. It is a proper 
starting point for thought since philosophy requires that “each thought be grasped in its 
full precision and that one is not content with vagueness and indeterminacy.”46 But when 
the understanding attempts to think entirely independently, without any sensitivity to the 
content it considers, it falls into the paradoxes which inevitably arise from empty 
abstraction. This is the confusion of thought’s first attempt to come into clarity, as “it is 
the way of youth to relish abstractions, whereas a person with the experience of life does 
not indulge in the abstract either-or, clinging instead to what is concrete.” 47 
2.2.2. Dianoia 
 The Platonic correlative to the understanding is not neatly captured in any single 
term. Doxa can equally function as a representational content and as the formal 
judgement of the understanding, as seen above. Yet representations can take the form of 
uneducated opinions, as in the usual translation of doxa, as well as definite propositions 
derived from a more sophisticated understanding. While Hegel sees philosophy as a 
 
46 EL §80, 128.  
 
47 EL §80, 128.  
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science (Wissenschaft) and so critiques modern representationalism for its insufficiency 
in achieving its aim of establishing philosophy as a self-grounding science, Plato’s 
Socrates does not presume such systematic aims of his interlocutors and so speaks with 
the uneducated and educated alike. Nonetheless, Plato does mark out where and how a 
direct and immediate doxa gives way to a formally rigorous method of thought. Hegel 
locates the moment where Plato begins to consider thought as science in the divided line 
analogy of Book 6 of Republic. Dianoia marks the transition between the visible and 
intelligible realms, a deductive, geometric thought which does not reason to first 
principles but takes them as given axioms. The content of thought in dianoia is 
representational, as proceeds from what had previously been the fleeting imitations of 
ideal beings in the first half of the divided line (tois tote mimētheisin), the part concerned 
with doxa, and takes them as stable, transcendental mental images (hōs eikosin).48 
Though dianoia is still dependent upon a representational model, it does not direct itself 
(dianooumenoi) towards the sensory objects from which the image arises, not toward the 
diagonal drawn, but the ideal diagonal, the diagonal itself (diametrou autēs).49  
 As in Hegel’s Phenomenology, thought now recognizes the untruth of what it had 
previously taken as absolute. The representational images of geometrical truth supersede 
sensory appearances, which earlier “were thought to be clear and to be valued as such.” 
From this standpoint, thought may now reason deductively from the images, 
presupposing their representational content as its starting point, but it cannot reason 
 
48 Republic 510b. 
 




upward towards a self-grounding first principle,50 towards the independent, 
presuppositionless thought Hegel found in the mature, speculative moments of Greek 
thought. Correlating dianoia with Verstand, Hegel opposes dianoia to dialectic in LHP. 
This opposition between the first moment of dianoia and the second moment of dialectic 
corresponds to the same opposition between the first and second moments of his own 
system.51 While extensively quoting from Socrates’ exposition of dianoia in Republic 
509-511, Hegel gives the following description of its role within in Platonic thought, 
Thus, according to Plato, this is certainly the place where real knowledge begins, 
because we have nothing further to do with the sensuous as such; at the same time 
this is not the true knowledge which considers the spiritual universal on its own 
account, but the arguing and reasoning knowledge that forms universal laws and 
particular kinds or species out of what is sensuous.52 
 
Just like Verstand, dianoia builds universal laws by abstracting from the sensuous, 
removing the abstract universal from the particular while neglecting to approach the 
universal as a content sui generis. This is the universal which stands as an indemonstrable 
presupposition over and against its particulars, attempting to function as the true 
universal, necessary and inherent to thought. But it remains in fact only an arbitrary 
particular. The Platonic association of dianoia with geometry further clarifies this point. 
A set of geometrical axioms seems like the set of necessary universal statements, and yet 
 
50 “This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, I said is intelligible [noēton], and, on the 
other, is such that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not travelling up to a first 
principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which 
images were made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear 
and to be valued as such.” Republic 511a. 
 
51 “What we have thus to deal with in the dialectic of Plato is the pure thought of reason, from 
which he very clearly distinguishes the understanding (dianoia).” LHP II, 53. 
 
52 LHP II, 47. 
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there are many valid sets of geometric axioms. However universally applicable these 
abstractions may be, they still reside one-sidedly in the free caprice of conscious 
subjectivity and offer no natural starting point for thought. 
 Plato shows dianoia’s insufficiency in establishing a first principle, as it attempts 
to give an account that depends on a first hypothesis of which no account can be given — 
its accounts must be either groundless or based on some other ground outside itself.53 
Dialektikē raises dianoia out of its vicious circle of presupposition and thus positions it as 
an intermediary moment in the movement of Platonic thought toward the light of the 
form of the good. Dianoia is “clearer than opinion [doxēs], darker than knowledge 
[epistēmēs].”54 Dialectic facilitates this movement of thought from doxa and noēsis. Doxa 
has a sensual content which depends upon a concrete mental image, and so it is 
subdivided with the visual imagination (eikasia) as the first moment and belief (pistis) as 
its second. As dianoia resolves sensuous content into abstract essence, it is the first 
moment in noesis, but as it cannot justify its hypotheses, it is not yet self-grounding 
epistēmē.55 
 R.G. Tanner further demonstrates how dianoia, as the understanding, takes a 
representational content. In Meno Plato associates the geometrical reasoning of dianoia 
 
53 “And as for the rest, I mean geometry and the subjects that follow it, we described them as to 
some extent grasping what is, for we saw that, while they do dream about what is, they are unable to 
command a waking view of it as long as they make use of hypotheses that they leave untouched and that 
they cannot give any account of. What mechanism could possibly turn any agreement into knowledge when 
it begins with something unknown and puts together the conclusion and the steps in between from what is 
unknown? None.” Republic 533b-c. 
 
54 Republic 533d. 
 
55 Republic 533e-534a. 
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with anamnēsis, as geometrical knowledge is a mental content which already exists 
within the soul of the learner. Geometrical reasoning, dianoia, makes explicit an already 
implicit content whose recollection is equally an abstraction from immediate present 
experience. The understanding recollects experiences already within the soul as 
representations. Anamnēsis involves the abstracting operation of the understanding in re-
presenting what has already past in the present. Tanner finds support for this reading of 
anamnēsis as a clarifying recollection performed through the understanding in Phaedrus. 
The divine mind sees what is “visible only to intelligence [theatē nō],” as it is nourished 
by the faculties of the intelligible section of the divided line, dianoia and epistēmē.56 As 
the soul undergoes the cycle of metempsychosis, it is the philosopher’s dianoia which 
recollects the memory of the heavenly forms and supplies it the wings necessary to reach 
the heavenly forms. 
But a soul that never saw the truth cannot take a human shape, since a human 
being must understand speech in terms of general forms [kat᾿eidos], proceeding to 
bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity [aisthēseōn eis hen 
logismō]. That process is the recollection [anamnēsis] of the things our soul saw 
when it was traveling with god, when it disregarded the things we now call real 
and lifted up its head to what is truly real instead. For just this reason it is fair that 
only a philosopher’s mind [hē tou philosophou dianoia] grows wings, since its 
memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to 
which the gods are divine.57 
 
As in Meno, the geometrical knowledge of dianoia enables a recollection of the forms. 
Dianoia is a distinctly human form of reasoning whose general form (eidos) depends on 
gathering perceptions into a single account. While this seems to suggest that dianoia 
 
56 Phaedrus 247c-d. 
 
57 Phaedrus 249c-d. 
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independently constructs the eidos from a raw sensual content, the form of the eidos is 
already implanted in the soul’s memory, an implicit formal principle waiting to be 
brought to clarity by a gathering abstraction.  
 From this psychological model in Phaedrus and from the association of 
anamnēsis and geometrical reasoning in Meno, Tanner concludes that the hypotheseis 
taken as axiomatic by dianoia in section B of the divided line in Republic are “mental 
images implanted in the memory” whose recollection [anamnēsis] “is stimulated by the 
perception of similar objects occurring in the world of sense.”58 Dianoia abstracts a 
general geometrical rule from a sensuous content which it gathers into a representation of 
mental images already presupposed in the philosopher’s memory. This internalized 
mental image is only a recollection of the forms but it is nonetheless a greater 
nourishment for the soul than the purely external “nourishment of doxa [trophē 
doxastē],”59 immediate sensory representations undetermined by any process of thought. 
It is at this point that pure thought begins. 
2.2.3. Summation 
 While the correlation between Verstand and dianoia is subject to the inherent 
difficulties in comparing ideas from two different periods of intellectual history, they 
share the following characteristics crucial to their role as the form of thought in the 
aporetic moment: 
1. They essentialize and abstract the representational contents described in 2.1 as 
models reducible to universal formulae. 
 
58 R. G. Tanner, "ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ and Plato's Cave," The Classical Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1970): 84. 
 
59 Phaedrus 248b. 
Saad 36 
 
2. They apply classical logic (the abstract self-equivalence of formal identity) to 
these contents in order to describe them through rigorous propositions. 
3. Despite their exhaustive precision in abstracting representational content, they 
are unable to give an account of their first principles, which must be accepted 
as axioms or hypotheses.  
4. Despite their capacity to clarify representational content, they are unable to 
resolve content which does not lend themselves to such a one-sided rendering, 
i.e. the good, the human psyche, thought itself. 
5. The abstract universal which results from this process of thought one-sidedly 
erases opposing determinations which the second moment of reflective 
thought will dialectically recover. 
 
3. The premature attempt to define the absolute 
 Through the content and form described above, thought naively attempts to define 
the higher concepts of God, the soul, and the ethical order — concepts which belong to 
Hegel’s Geist and to the Socratic practice of philosophy as improving the soul through 
knowing the good.  
3.1. Abstract finite predicates of Geist 
 The philosophical understanding strives to emulate the natural sciences in 
establishing definitions for its most fundamental concepts. These definitions describe the 
abstracted particulars which define a given concept as a universal class. But while birds 
may be determined as “flighted” or “flightless” without any problematic reduction in the 
content of the abstract representation, philosophy does not aim at defining its concepts 
through their particular qualities. It aims at articulating the concrete universal which 
holds mutually contradictory predicates at once. Philosophy’s intended content, the 
content of Geist  — thought, history and society, the divine — are movements irreducible 
to fixed predication other than through a hopelessly one-sided reduction which distorts as 
much as it clarifies.  
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 The understanding became especially concerned with definitions in the work of 
early modern, pre-critical rationalists.60 No longer captive to religious representations, the 
thinking mind could appropriate the scholastic habit of determining the spiritual universal 
through an abstract, particular property. Proceeding from the self-certainty of thought as 
established in the Cartesian cogito, these definitions would no longer be dependent upon 
the authority of a catechism but rather arise through thought’s own activity. Ultimately, 
this moment in the history of thought is characterized by its naïve confidence in a one-
sided resolution of metaphysical disputation in direct predication, as it presupposed that 
the highest objects of knowledge must be either finite or infinite, either simple or 
composite.61  
 The judgement arises as the determination of the representation, in which the 
initial representation, the representation given in its pure immediacy, forms the subject, 
whose predicate arises from a further determination of the understanding. 
This is expressed by every sentence insofar as in it what the subject is, i.e. the 
initial representation, is supposed to be indicated first by the predicate (i.e. in 
philosophy by means of the thought-determination) […] In the sentence ‘God is 
eternal etc.’ we start with the representation of God, but what he is, is not yet 
known [gewußt] […] The form of the sentence, or, more precisely, of the 
judgment is in any case unsuitable to express that which is concrete and 
speculative – and the true is concrete. A judgment is one-sided on account of its 
form and to that extent false.62 
 
60 Namely Descartes and Leibniz. Spinoza may be regarded in a similar vein though Hegel regards 
his notion of the self-caused cause as a significant advancement. See 4.1. for more discussion about Hegel’s 
general grouping of early modern thinkers. 
 
61 “Predicates such as these are, for example, existence, as in the sentence ‘God possesses 
existence’; finitude or infinity, as in the question whether the world is finite or infinite; simple or 
composite, as in the sentence ‘the soul is simple’; also ‘the thing is one, a whole’, and so on. – There was 
no investigation as to whether such predicates are something true in and of themselves, nor whether the 
form of judgment is capable of being the form of truth.” EL §28, 68. 
 




This passage well summarizes how the understanding develops a representational 
content. A representation is first given externally, as a fact of experience. This immediate 
representational content, taken in advance of any determination, also entails a 
presupposition — the understanding presupposes that the representation can be 
determined through the judgement. This presupposition can be maintained only if the 
content remains external and objectified, if it presents itself to consciousness only as an 
unknown “something”. The understanding then arrives at an exclusive and necessary 
determination, the essence represented in a definition. The definition arises as the 
judgement of the understanding which synthesizes the received representation with a 
predicate abstracted as essential.  
 But this predicate is only an abstracted finite particular, insufficient to describe 
any content that is not presented as an immediate external object, which includes the 
entire speculative content of philosophy. The attempt to admit contradictory predicates by 
taking God as both finite and infinite, or the human being as rational and irrational, 
undermines the meta-presupposition of the understanding that all content can be rendered 
intelligible to the laws of classical logic. The representation, presented as an immediacy, 
must resolve into an immediate unity, even if one-sided and insufficient.63 Taking the 
particular for the concrete, the understanding rigidly fixates on a single determination 
 
63 “Predicates such as these represent in and of themselves a limited content and show themselves 
to be inadequate to the fullness of the representation (of God, nature, spirit, and so forth) and in no way 
exhaustive. Moreover, by virtue of being predicates of one subject, they are bound up with one another and 
yet they are diverse on account of their content. As a result, they are taken up in opposition to one another 




because the alternative is to be lost in the bad infinity of endless particulars given equal 
weight as determinations of the absolute.64 The defining predicate must be maintained as 
an infinite particular qua universal lest the object dissolve into infinite particularity qua 
multiplicity.  
3.1.1. Analogy to the attempt to understand force in the Phenomenology 
 An analogous tension between the one universal predicate and the many other 
determinations can be observed in the dialectic of natural consciousness in Chapter 3 of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology. Consciousness has passed through the immediacy of sense-
certainty and perception and now attempts to unify the multiplicity of properties taken up 
in an object into a single, universal unit — what is, for natural consciousness, a defining 
essence. But as consciousness has not yet reflected into itself and become self-
consciousness, it takes this unit in a purely external fashion, unable to take the 
unconditioned universal property “as something which is not objective — which is 
the inner (unperceived) being of things.”65 The object has only been attributed an external 
unity without consciousness recognizing the interiority of this unity — the reflection of 
the object into itself which becomes manifest to consciousness in the phenomenon of 
force, the supersensible reality whose outward manifestations reflect an unseen immanent 
unity. This inner reflection of the universal is the movement towards the concrete 
 
64 Hegel draws a connection between this form of bad infinity and the multiplicity of avatars of 
God in eastern religion (presumably Hinduism). “The Orientals sought to overcome the first defect, in the 
determination of God, for instance, by means of the many names they attributed to him. At the same time, 
however, there were supposed to be infinitely many of those names.” EL §29, 70. 
 




universal, which, as an object of consciousness, remains divided in the dialectic between 
the endless multiplicity of its elements and their unity.  
Since, however, this unconditioned universal is an object for consciousness, the 
distinction of form and content makes its appearance within it: and, in the shape 
of content, the moments have the aspect in which they were first presented – that 
of being on one side a universal medium of many substantial elements, and, on 
the other, a unit reflected into self, where their substantial independence is 
overthrown and done away with.66  
 
 It is the special nature of force which demands that consciousness overcome this 
opposition. The genus of force is inseparable from its many expressions. For natural 
consciousness, thinking about force requires that the apparently external reality of the 
world be fully inverted (verkehrt). The apparent abstractions from concrete experience 
are, upon this inversion, the unified, inner substance itself. This reckoning with force 
initiates the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness, from an outer awareness 
of external finite properties to an inner awareness of the concrete universal. This is the 
pivot in natural consciousness as it overturns the understanding, 
When we thus keep both moments in this immediate unity, it is Understanding 
[Verstand], to which the conception of force belongs, that is, properly speaking, 
the principle which carries the different moments qua different. For per se they 
are not to be different; the distinction consequently exists only in thought [i.e. the 
thought of the understanding] […] Hence for force to be what it truly is, it has to 
be completely set free from thought, and put forward as the substantial reality of 
these differences, that is, first the substance qua the entire force remaining 
essentially self-contained [an und für sich], and then its differences as substantial 
entities, or as moments subsisting each on its own account.67 
 
 
66 PM, 182. 
 




Force, seen only in its expressions, marks the limit of the understanding’s ability to 
conceptualize the natural world through abstract representations. Force is the natural 
analogy to the true concrete universal. It is immanently integrated as one only through its 
many expressions, which are not examples of force but constitute force itself. The 
distinction between genus and species, between outer class and inner content, has been 
overturned. A science capable of reckoning with force and the still more inwardly self-
contained phenomena of Geist recognizes the unity of the inner, living movement of the 
object and its outer expressions.  
3.2. The Socratic search for definitions of ethical truth 
 The Socratic dialogues showcase Socrates urging his interlocutors to offer a 
definition for political and moral concepts. He seeks their defining essence, what they are 
purely upon their own account, auto kath’ auto.68 To take three representative examples 
of these Socratic dialogues, piety (to eusebes/to hosion) is the object of inquiry in 
Euthyphro, friendship (philia) in Lysis, and temperance (sōphrosynē) in Charmides. 
These dialogues are famously aporetic, as each attempt at definition fails, and yet the 
Socratic search for definition auto kath’ auto continues in the middle and later dialogues. 
The protracted thought experiments in Republic originate in the question of defining 
justice (to dikaion), while Theaetetus is a more mature aporetic attempt to define 
knowledge (epistēmē).  
 
68 Glaucon, echoing the common refrain of Socrates, wants a definition of justice “itself according 
to itself [auto kath’ auto].” “But I’m not yet satisfied by the argument on either side. I want to know what 
justice and injustice are and what power each itself [auto kath’ auto] has when it’s by itself in the soul. I 
want to leave out of account their rewards and what comes from each of them.” Republic 358b. 
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 Socrates’ search for definitions has a clear immediate moral relevance. 
Throughout the Platonic corpus, Socrates aims at the moral improvement of the youth of 
Athens by disputing the moral vocabulary passively received from cultural authorities as 
the doxai social moral convention. Clarifying these representations is the inescapable first 
step towards ethical inquiry. Without a proper definition, moral desiderata cannot be 
obtained, 69 nor can their presence or absence in oneself be detected,70 nor can their 
benefits be ascertained.71 As Aristotle makes clear in the following passage from 
Metaphysics, Socrates inaugurated the search for definitions as part of his wider inquiry 
into ethical conduct. 
Socrates occupied himself with the ethical virtues, seeking for the first time to 
define these as a whole [horizesthai katholou] (for, of all the students of natural 
science, Democritus grasped only little of the subject and, in his way, defined “the 
warm” and “the cold.” And the Pythagoreans, for their part, defined some few 
things, whose account they bound up with numbers, such things as what is 
“opportunity” and “justice” and “marriage”)? and indeed he properly [eulogōs] 
sought [ezētei] the defining essence, i.e. what something is [to ti esti]. For he 
sought to reason through the syllogism [syllogizesthai], and indeed the origin 
[archē] of the syllogism is the defining essence [to ti esti]. […] For two 
innovations are rightly attributed to Socrates, inductive logic and defining as a 
 
69 “Then isn’t it necessary for us to start out knowing what virtue [aretē] is? Because if we are not 
absolutely certain what it is, how are we going to advise anyone as to the best method of obtaining it?” 
Laches 190b-c. 
 
70 “But good heavens, Socrates, I don’t know whether I have it [sōphrosynē] or whether I don’t—
because how would I know the nature of a thing when neither you nor Critias is able to discover it, as you 
say?” Charmides 176a-b. 
 
71 Socrates admits that he himself has been led astray from the search for definition in the opening 
of Republic. “Before finding the answer to our first inquiry about what justice is, I let that go and turned to 
investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue. Then an argument 
came up about injustice being more profitable than justice, and I couldn’t refrain from abandoning the 
previous one and following up on that. Hence the result of the discussion, as far as I’m concerned, is that I 
know nothing, for when I don’t know what justice is, I’ll hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, 




whole [to horizesthai katholou], and these both concern the starting point of 
knowledge [peri archēn epistēmēs].72 
 
Socrates’ search for universal definitions is closely related to his making human affairs 
the subject of theoretical life.73 As the parenthetical remark suggests, the content of 
natural science and mathematics neither required nor allowed such a definition of the 
whole. The physicists did not define the whole but, in the same reductive methodology of 
modern natural science, described only the properties of warmth and coldness. Somewhat 
more eccentrically, the Pythagoreans, taking quantity as the fundamental ontological 
reality, attempted to define human concepts through number. Socrates’ concern for 
human affairs led him to define on the whole (horizesthai katholou) in the proper way 
(eulogōs). Attempting to define virtue, courage, and political life demanded thinking 
katholou, thinking on the whole. 
 I have deliberately avoided translating katholou as “universally” or “in universal 
terms” as there is a philosophically significant etymological distinction between the 
Greek and the Latin derivatives. While the adverbial form katholou appears in Aristotle, 
the same idea is elsewhere expressed as the prepositional phrase kath' holou, “in 
accordance with the whole”, with holos being the root of and having the same meaning as 
English “whole.” Socrates seeks a definition adequate to the whole, one appropriate to 
the manifold of content considered in human conduct. The Latinate “universal”, on the 
 
72 Translation is my own. Metaphysics 13.178b19-30.  
 
73 Kirkland, who also cites this passage, also comments on the connection between moral 
improvement and universal definition, “Broadly speaking, this has been taken as an adequate and perfectly 
manifest description of the Socratic aim of self-knowledge—we search for knowledge of ourselves with 




hand, stresses not the concrete wholeness of the content but the abstract unity of their 
representation. It is the whole unus-versus, “turned into one” — rendered into a unity, a 
definition which, following Hegel’s critique of the definitions of the understanding, 
represents the whole as an abstract particular. While this account of Socratic thinking as 
katholou perhaps depends upon the Aristotelian development of the syllogism, it should 
be noted that neither Plato nor Aristotle defines the universal as the numerical “one”, a 
term which would confirm the representational tendency of definition through an 
abstracted particular. The search for the definitions is a search for the object on its own 
terms, auto kath’ auto, which must be in accordance with the whole, katholou. 
 But precisely because Socrates intends the concrete universal he will not find a 
the representational definition adequate. Modern scholarship regards the aporia as a 
fundamental paradox of the dialogues, as the early Socrates at once proclaims the 
fundamental importance of knowledge while undermining the propositions of his 
interlocutors, however apparently reasonable. 74 A reading of the text informed by 
Hegel’s critique of the understanding suggests that Socrates is only demonstrating the 
futility of the philosophical method presupposed in seeking definitions. The search for a 
defining predicate first hypothesizes the doxa of the object of inquiry (justice, piety, etc.) 
 
74 Kirkland presents Gregory Vlastos’ standard reading of the Socrates of the early dialogues as 
problematically paradoxical, containing an untenable tension between moral commitment and a purely 
negative epistemological program. “Indeed, Vlastos insists that everything be viewed in the obscuring light 
of what he elsewhere refers to as ‘the paradox of Socrates.’ That central paradox is as follows. Socrates is, 
on the one hand, committed to the search for ethical knowledge, and he insists that only in the possession of 
such knowledge are we able to live well as human beings[…] And yet, on the other hand, in both word and 
deed, Socrates consistently seems to undermine the very possibility of this knowledge. Throughout the 
early dialogues, he declares in both general and specific terms that even after a lifetime of exemplary 
searching he knows nothing.” Kirkland, xvi.  
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and then sees this hypothesis fall into self-contradiction. The doxa is clarified through the 
judgement in accordance with the formula to ti esti, the “what something is.” When this 
definition fails, the understanding hypothesizes and tests a new predicate. The final 
aporia is not just a defeat of the particular definitions but of the entire method of thought 
which has led to this aporetic moment. Dianoia is insufficient for the objects of moral 
consideration Socrates hopes to define. Knowledge of human affairs is preeminently a 
knowledge of the whole, the immediate definition of which must, like the scholastic and 
early modern definitions of God, remain one-sided.  
 The aporetic moment should turn the reading of Socrates as a naïve rationalist on 
its head. The aporia arises because Socrates coyly adopts the naïve starting point of 
thought in order show its limitations. It is not the Socratic, but the sophistic method of 
reasoning which comprehends the truth as turning upon mere definitions. Plato indeed 
reports that the proper definition of terms was known as an area of interest for the sophist 
Prodicus, who offers a course on the subject.75 Sophistic argumentation attempted to win 
its cases in the law courts on purely terminological grounds, making the stronger 
argument the weaker by an otherwise implausible chain of deduction from an 
immediately given definition.  
 The sophist is in this respect quite similar to the mathematician, who also begins 
reasoning from an axiomatic definition. In Theaetetus, Theaetetus is presented as a 
prodigy in geometry under the tutelage of the famed mathematician Theodorus. These 
 




Socratic interlocuters are trained in a more rigorous, mathematical dianoia, and yet they 
are still closely associated with the sophists, with Socrates even referring to the decidedly 
unmathematical Protagoras as Theodorus’ teacher.76 The aporetic moment is common to 
discourse with sophists and mathematicians, as the dialogue still ends with them unable 
to reach a suitable definition of epistēmē. As the association of dianoia with geometry 
suggests, mathematical reasoning and sophistic argument are more alike than unlike, as 
they are both unable to reach a definition for knowledge because they take their method 
and content as self-evident. As Andy German argues, the “universally alleged clarity of 
mathematics” allows its practitioners to avoid dialectical reflection, so that “sophistry 
finds an unwitting ally in mathematicians, of all people.”77 Constituting the third segment 
of the divided line in Republic, mathematical dianoia does not fall into the same 
rhetorical manipulation as sophistry, yet, as the purely external operation of 
consciousness, does not comprehend itself, does not achieve the “form of self-knowledge 
that transmutes mathematical sciences into dialectic.”78 
 Richard Robinson’s seminal work on the early dialogues critiques the Socratic 
search for definitions in the language of analytic philosophy. Socrates posits “what is X” 
as the starting point of inquiry, following the mathematical form of reasoning which 
 
76 Theaetetus 179a. 
 
77 Andy German, “Mathematical Self-Ignorance and Sophistry,” in Knowledge and Ignorance of 
Self in Platonic Philosophy, ed. by James Ambury and Andy German (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 
162. 
 
78 German, 165. 
Saad 47 
 
demands that terms be defined at the outset of any investigation. But for the question 
“what is X?” to be coherent, four assumptions must hold:  
 1.) “X” is univocal  
 2.) “X” has an essence 
 3.) a realist assumption about the ontological status of this essence 
 4.) “X” must not be a primary but have a structure which can be articulated79  
 
These are essentially the assumptions underlying the understanding, which presumes as 
its content univocal, external objects which can be universalized by articulating their 
essential structure. The external objects of natural scientific and mathematical research 
largely match these criteria, to which ethical conduct is crudely assimilated. This 
objectification is further emphasized in the use of the Greek definite article to in the 
expression of the ethical idea under consideration, as in Euthyphro we seek to define a 
hypostatized to hostion, “the pious.” Yet the search for ethical definitions is not the 
search an object, but for the human being, who may be “a beast more complicated and 
savage than Typhon.”80 
4. Socratic aporia contra modern presupposition 
 The attempt to define the universal through a definitional predicate fails in both 
antiquity and modernity, but the reaction to this failure is very different. Plato accepts 
aporia as a clearing away of presuppositions, while moderns replace failed 
presuppositions with an equally representational standpoint of thought towards its object. 
 
79 Richard Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1941), 60.  
 
80 Phaedrus 230a. 
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4.1. Hegel’s critique of presupposition in modern dualistic consciousness 
 In EL §§26-78, Hegel presents a brief history of philosophy in order to 
demonstrate the persistence of presuppositions in modern thought, which begins with the 
presupposition of a Cartesian ego. His logic will be distinguished as a return to 
presuppositionless “free Greek thought” against this historical background. This section 
of the thesis is only intended to develop Hegel’s positioning of his own project against a 
wide tendency toward presupposition he discerns in modern philosophy. It does not 
attempt to directly engage thinkers Hegel himself often leaves nameless.81 Moreover, it 
does not attempt to tell the full story of Hegel’s engagement with modern philosophy, 
which has, in other respects, made significant advancements over the Greeks, particularly 
in the development of the principle of subjectivity. It intends only to follow Hegel’s 
reading of modern philosophy in the preliminary conceptions of EL, where the 
shortcomings of modern thought are presented as a dialectical stimulus to the 
development of a presuppositionless logic. 
4.1.1. Rationalist metaphysics (§26-§36) 
 In Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as developed in history, the insufficient 
predicates of the absolute first developed in medieval scholasticism constituted an aporia 
which has set modern philosophy down a path of presupposition. The early moderns were 
not in a position to concede their own ignorance of God and the soul; philosophy now 
 
81  “Metaphysics,” for instance, remains a generalization about early moderns like Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibniz whose insights were taken up by Wolff and generically disseminated to Hegel and 
other students of the German academy. For our purposes, we may understand it broadly as the set of 
presuppositions belonging to pre-critical modern philosophy.  
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existed in a social context when aporia was not an option, as the Christian religion 
educated in non-negotiable representations, in creeds and dogmas. One no longer had the 
Greek freedom to remain eclectic or undecided about the gods.  
 Early modern philosophy asserted its independence by replacing religious 
representations with representations derived from thought itself.  Cartesian rationalism 
takes the activity of the thinking mind as the only presupposition upon which all further 
philosophizing rests. The cogito entrenched the presumption that thought, as the only 
form of being beyond all skepticism, must always be ontologically prior to its object. 
This naively metaphysical anticipation of Kantian transcendental subjectivity is still fully 
confident that thought can reach an objective standpoint without any self-critical account 
of its limitations. Thus these metaphysicians set out to directly understand the absolute as 
an object of thought like any other, so that it is “presupposed in general that knowledge 
of the absolute could take place by attributing predicates to it.”82 This presupposition of 
metaphysics is the inverse of that which will later arise in critical philosophy, as it is 
characterized by the “naïve belief in general that thinking grasps the in-itself of things.”83 
 This form of metaphysics began in the wider secular spirit of modernity, as it 
aimed to replace the presuppositions of Church dogma by presupposing only reason, and 
indeed demonstrating that res cogitans alone was immune to doubt. Such a 
presupposition emerged as the reaction against an external religious authority, setting up 
the presupposition of the mind’s own sovereignty in its place. Hegel recognizes this as a 
 
82 EL, §28, 68. 
 
83 EL, §28, 68. 
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distinctively modern presupposition, and the section on rationalist metaphysics in EL 
ends with an explicit disavowal of interpretations of Plato and Aristotle which read them 
in this post-Cartesian spirit of thought as a first principle.84 Lacking a dualism of subjects 
and objects, Greek thought was incapable of positing consciousness as a first principle. 85 
The presuppositions involved in this sort of metaphysics are only possible to a medieval 
or modern mind deeply tutored in thought as the objectification of external 
representations.  
4.1.2. Empiricism (§37-§39) 
 Empiricism will now aim to clear away the inadequate presupposition of res 
cogitans as the starting point of all philosophy. David Hume demonstrates that the formal 
laws of thought taken as valid in rationalist metaphysics do not find any evidentiary basis 
in the external world, the material world of res extensa separate from thought. Induction, 
causality, and moral laws only arise from habit. Contraposed against the free flow of 
experience, the abstract laws of rationalist metaphysics suddenly seem just as 
presumptuous and arbitrary as medieval dogma. Knowing metaphysics to be inadequate, 
the empiricists sought a “concrete content”, a counter to the tyranny of empty formulae, 
 
84 “Plato is not this kind of metaphysician, and Aristotle even less so, although it is usually 
believed that the opposite is the case.” EL §36, 78. 
 
85 Hegel emphasizes that we must read Plato without a modern sense of subject/object dualism. 
“The case is similar with regard to questions regarding the limits of knowledge, the opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity which had not yet come up in Plato’s age. The independence of the “I” within 
itself and its explicit existence was foreign to him; man had not yet gone back within himself, had not yet 
set himself forth as explicit. The subject was indeed the individual as free, but as yet he knew himself only 




“a firm foothold against the possibility of being able to prove everything on the plane of, 
and by the method of, finite determinations.”86 
 But all empiricism has done is presuppose material content over and above any 
formal principle by which it is apprehended. It is equally as blind to its own 
presumptions, as it depends upon the system of abstract finite determination of the 
material world already established in metaphysics. “Presupposing and applying the forms 
of syllogistic inference,” empiricism in fact “uses those [i.e. metaphysics’] categories and 
their relationships in a completely uncritical and unconscious fashion.”87 Empiricism 
takes analysis as the concrete operation of the mind, the type of thinking which breaks 
down the whole into its tangible component parts. And yet it presupposes analysis as the 
only operation of the mind and the only form of access to the object of thought. It accepts 
the division between thought and its object and suggests that thought must break down its 
object, an already-formed representation, by a rigorous reductive method. Plus ça 
change, plus c'est la même chose, and “we are back with the presupposition of the old 
metaphysics, namely that the truth of things is to be found in thought.”88 
 Empiricism does, however, exclusively concern itself with “the sensory content of 
nature and of finite spirit.”89 Why should Hegel then claim it was only the Greeks who 
are free from any non-sensory presupposition? The distinction is subtle but crucial. While 
 
86 EL §37, 78. 
 
87 EL §38, 79. 
 
88 EL §38, 81. 
 




the Greeks “stand entirely within sense perception [ganz in sinnlicher Anschauung 
stehen],” 90 they are not theoretically constrained by it. While Aristotle’s credentials as a 
realist have never been in doubt, he does not regard sense perception as actual thought. 
Pure content without form, aisthēsis “is common to all, easy, and has nothing to do with 
wisdom.”91 As in the progression of Hegel’s Phenomenology, standing entirely within 
sense perception at the outset need not and should not imply that one holds on to sense 
perception as an ultimate principle even as one encounters its limitations. The most 
glaring limitation of empiricism is that the mind which posits an empirical standard is 
itself entirely unaccounted for by this standard, a fact still lamented in the “hard problem 
of consciousness” in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. All mental content, 
including empirical content, is always immanently involved with its formal principle. If 
empiricism attempts to take only the material as its content, it has already engaged in an 
abstraction, as matter itself  “cannot be perceived as such.”92 The mind can only 
recognize and differentiate mind from matter insofar as it has conceded some concept of 
mind, however inchoate.  
 The difference between Greek aisthēsis and modern empiricism ultimately goes 
back to modernity’s restrictive representational understanding of sensory perception. 
Aristotle sees aisthēsis as a bare content which can develop into the knowledge of technē, 
epistēmē, and sophia. Modern empiricism, on the other hand, does not allow for this 
 
90 EL, §31, 71. 
 
91 Metaphysics 982a. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, trans. by Hugh Tredennick 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933). 
 
92 EL §38, 81. 
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evolution of the form of thought to meet an increasingly complex content. To take sense 
experience as a presupposition is to assume that experience must be divisible into 
concrete, atomic facts, a presupposition which in fact ends up denying much of the 
content of experience. The representation of the Cartesian “clear and distinct” is held 
over and against the wider verdict of the senses. The external world also contains 
indeterminate quantum states, interdependent ecologies, and forces which act through 
matter even while being in themselves essentially immaterial. Modern reductive 
empiricism is not Greek aisthēsis, a neutral soil from which many diverse flowers of 
wisdom may blossom, but a school in which the chemistry teacher, competent as she may 
be in her own domain, has been told to design and implement the entire curriculum by the 
principles of her science.   
4.1.3. The critical philosophy (§40-§60) 
 Rational metaphysics and empiricism were externally focused on the object of 
thought, whether that object might be an abstract essence or a concrete particular. With 
Kant’s critical philosophy, thought itself is critiqued as containing unexamined 
presuppositions. Kant will point out that our access to any such content is mediated by 
subjectivity itself, which is not and cannot be the epistemically neutral operator 
presupposed in these earlier moments in modern thought. As with each movement in this 
history, critical philosophy’s greatest accomplishment is to make visible the 
presuppositions of what came before. Critical philosophy showed that empiricism 
presupposed a consciousness capable of analytic thought, yet it had little to nothing to say 
about the subjectivity which contained such thoughts. Empiricism only negatively denied 
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any claim put forth about subjectivity as unjustified and incoherent, as in Hume’s famous 
definition of the self as a “bundle of impressions.” On the other side, rationalist 
metaphysics persisted in fixing inadequate one-sided predicates to the subjective human 
soul, echoing a dogma of medieval origin. The contrary qualities of the soul could not be 
admitted to the fixed determination of the understanding, with the result that the soul is 
rigidly designated as simple and immutable despite also containing internal difference, 
“at the same time distinguishing itself from itself within itself.” 93 Kant’s rigorous 
demonstration of the inadequacy of the understanding to contemplate objects of pure 
reason fully clears away these one-sided predicates of the soul. Hegel regards this 
overthrow of this persistent scholastic doctrine was a “great result” which freed up 
philosophy to give a genuine account of subjectivity.94 
 The presupposition of an object of thought accessible to finite determination falls 
away, and in Kant’s antinomies reason (Vernunft) recognizes the understanding 
(Verstand) as yielding contradictory accounts. Qua pure reason, the understanding does 
not achieve the definite determination it upholds as the basis of all cognition. In the 
antinomies, the world can be demonstrated to be either finite or infinite, either wholly 
simple or composite. The “either-or” of the understanding has met its limitation. 
Philosophy now has a perspective from which to recognize and critique the 
understanding’s reliance upon finite determinations. Hegel regards this development as 
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“essential and necessary … one of the most important and profound advances in the 
philosophy of recent times.”95  
 Yet while Kant arrives at only four antinomies, Hegel sees these antinomies as 
immanent in every operation of the understanding. Kant restricted himself from realizing 
the deeper truth of the understanding’s insufficiency and so went on to relocate its 
presuppositions in the categories of transcendental subjectivity. He “presupposed the 
table of categories and in so doing … place[d] the determination of an object under an 
otherwise ready-made schema, instead of deriving them from the concept.”96 The 
principle of subjectivity relies upon an a priori schema and so thought withdraws into an 
inescapable dualism. As Vernunft determined in the antinomies, the categories of the 
understanding will never be sufficient for the determination of an unconditioned object of 
thought, i.e. the content of metaphysics. Limited by a presupposed formal principle, 
Kantian subjectivity “would have nothing but the categories at its disposal. Insofar as it 
wants to use them for this purpose, it soars over [überfliegend] objects (it becomes 
transcendent).”97 The representational principle at work in metaphysics and empiricism 
only becomes formal and transcendental. The categories always mediate our sensory 
engagement with experience. Empiricism mistook presupposition-laden representations 
for sense experience, but Kant leaves subjectively mediated Vorstellungen as the only 
possible content of philosophical thought. The presupposition of the representational 
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understanding is more deeply reaffirmed even as it is more explicitly recognized than 
ever before.  
4.1.4. Immediate knowledge (§61-§78) 
 The idealist response to Kant takes subjectivity’s recognition of its own mediation 
as the incorrect presupposition in Kantian philosophy. Hegel reads the philosophies of 
figures like Jacobi, Fichte, and Schelling as correcting this presupposition by holding that 
knowledge is wholly unmediated, im-mediate (un-mittelbar), and thus unplagued by the 
dualism of Kantian philosophy. In the spirit of Sturm und Drang, they asserted that “the 
truth is for the spirit” so that “knowing [Wissen], believing [Glauben], thinking, [and] 
intuiting” are equally and at once “presupposed as familiar [bekannt vorausgesetzt].”98 
While belief is opposed to knowing in ordinary use, as the former is immediate and the 
latter mediated, immediate knowledge dissolves this distinction. Belief is “specified as 
immediate knowing and thus recognized at once as also a kind of knowing [Wissen].” 99  
 This equation of Glauben and Wissen produces a content scarcely different from 
the empty determinations of metaphysics and empiricism, which also foreswore all 
mediation. The believer, which is to say, the immediate knower, apprehends the object of 
his cognition as if this apprehension did not require any process whatsoever, as if the 
content of such belief and knowledge were always familiar in advance (voraus). Despite 
the Christian intentions of most of these thinkers, their knowledge of God only reaches 
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the “dry abstractum of immediate knowing, a completely formal determination.”100 But 
immediate knowledge need not necessarily reach for such an exulted object. It is also the 
default philosophy of humankind insofar as it is untheoretical and takes the immediate 
consciousness of common sense (Gemeinsinn) as the truth.101  
 Immediacy takes us back to the beginning of modern philosophy, as Hegel 
interprets Descartes’ attempt to find a single foundational point for all inquiry as an 
attempt to escape theological mediation. Like all systems of immediacy, however, 
Descartes’ philosophy is based on a mediating presupposition. In settling his doubt only 
after arriving at the truth of mental activity, Descartes sets out in advance that 
consciousness must be clear and distinct while external being must be fleeting and 
transitory.102 Consciousness only seems so clear and distinct to Descartes insofar as it is 
recognized in its immediacy. Yet this immediacy does not necessarily imply any 
determinate content for the consciousness it implies. The cogito is not a fully developed 
syllogism, as Descartes concedes, but a “simple intuition of consciousness” apparently 
fortified against all skeptical doubt.103 This self-knowledge is abstractly deduced from the 
barest form of self-recognition. It can only achieve a shallow certainty by forestalling the 
critical inquiry into the content of subjectivity by asserting the formal identity of the first-
person pronoun.  
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 Descartes is indeed the originator of this entire chain of presuppositions and 
subsequent reactions, and so it is proper that the reaction against the dualistic mediation 
of Kantian subjectivity is a romantic reincarnation of the immediate Cartesian subject. 
From the beginning of modern philosophy, this immediate Cartesian consciousness has 
been behind every presupposition, however much it may have been qualified as rationally 
intelligible (metaphysics), scientifically adequate (empiricism), transcendentally self-
limiting (critical philosophy), or immediately self-evident (various forms of immediacy). 
The return to immediacy is a return to Descartes which finally brings out the two 
fundamental presuppositions underlying each of these systems: the presupposition of an 
internal consciousness opposed to external objects and the presupposition of an 
opposition between self-standing (selbständig) forms of mediation and immediacy.104 
Hegel aims to overcome this pattern in the history of philosophy by demoting the 
understanding to a moment of the whole movement of thought, just as the aporia is the 
moment which ends the naïve search for defining predicates in Plato. 
4.2. Aporia as the insufficiency of definition 
 Having undertaken the exceptional task of dismantling conventional opinion, 
Socrates, with an ironic modesty, excuses himself from offering any further definitions. 
His refusal to positively claim knowledge sets him apart from the many who falsely claim 
knowledge but have none upon examination.105 Socrates seems like a skeptic in this 
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aporetic moment, an interpretation of the dialogues championed by Cicero and the 
skeptical Hellenistic New Academy, who denied even the positive knowledge of one’s 
own ignorance which Socrates left himself and so withheld assent from all 
propositions.106 Taking the aporetic moment in isolation as the final verdict of a primarily 
skeptical Platonic philosophy places the apparent epistemological stance of the early 
dialogues in sharp tension with their ethical purpose. This seeming difficulty is overcome 
if the aporia is taken not as a conclusion, but as a moment of thought characterized by the 
presupposition of ethical content as directly predicable, a moment followed by a concrete 
deepening of thought in philosophical dialectic. Socrates clearly has not given up on the 
ethical altogether, but only on approaching it as an object capable of definite predication, 
as a representation easily wielded as self-evident in the rhetorical sphere of public life. 
 Plato marks Socratic aporia by highlighting its irony, softening its edges and 
indicating that the failure to find a definition proceeds only from the obtuse abstraction of 
the entire enterprise. Socrates and his interlocutors are no less convinced of the existence 
and crucial importance of these ethical ideas even after they have been fully dismantled. 
These dialogues sometimes even conclude with Socrates affirming the importance of the 
ethical notion he has just demonstrated is unknown to both him and his interlocutor! 
Though Charmides, Critias, and Socrates are unable to define sōphrosynē or discern its 
benefits, Socrates concludes by encouraging the young Charmides to nonetheless regard 
himself as happy insofar as he has this virtue, even if it is indiscernible through logos, 
So see whether you do have it [sōphrosynē] and are in no need of the charm—
because if you do have it, my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a 
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babbler, incapable of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument 
[logō], and yourself as being exactly as happy as you are temperate 
[sōphronesteros].107  
 
Aporia does not invalidate the virtue itself so much as the conceit of one who aims to 
definitively discourse and pontificate upon the virtue with magisterial authority. Having 
subtly adopted posture of the sophist, Socrates has reduced him to a harmless old babbler, 
called on the bluff of presenting hard and fast definitions of doxai as genuine ideas. True 
ethical life remains unimpacted by the limitations of logos, an idea echoed by an equally 
self-effacing Socrates at the conclusion of Lysis.  
Now we’ve done it, Lysis and Menexenus—made fools of ourselves, I, an old 
man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that we are friends 
of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not 
yet been able to find out.108 
 
With the discourse on philia ending in aporia, the failure of abstract definition is brought 
into comic contrast with the interlocutors’ concrete friendship. The aporia does not point 
toward the skeptical abyss, but towards the failure of an abstracted form of moral 
reasoning.  
4.2.1. Hegel’s account of Socratic method and aporia 
 In LHP, Hegel presents the Socratic method as an early moment of thought which 
aims at the development of the concrete idea even as it ends in aporia. Even as Socrates 
and his interlocuters seek the definition of an external object, the method of Socratic 
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cross-examination transforms the immediate consciousness of external, conventional 
doxai into a reflective self-consciousness appropriate to the concrete universal. 
By going to the work-places of tailors and shoemakers, and entering into 
discourse with them, as also with youths and old men, Sophists, statesmen, and 
citizens of all kinds, he in the first place took their interests as his topic — 
whether these were household interests, the education of children, or the interests 
of knowledge or of truth. Then he led them on from a definite case to think of the 
universal, and of truths and beauties which had absolute value, since in every 
case, from the individual’s own thoughts, he derived the conviction and 
consciousness of that which is the definite right.109 
 
 Even as Socrates and his interlocutors attempt to hunt down the good as if it were 
an alien content presented as ready-made to consciousness, the dialectical give and take 
of the dialogues undermines this conceit. The interlocutors themselves become just as 
much the object of inquiry as the pious and the just. As in Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
consciousness must turn inward and become self-consciousness to comprehend the 
concrete universal. Achieving this universalized self-consciousness by demonstrating the 
falsity of representational consciousness, the purpose of the aporia is to “inspire men with 
distrust towards their presuppositions, after faith had become wavering and they were 
driven to seek that which is, in themselves.”110 Socrates only demands that doxai 
manifest the self-evident simplicity they are claimed to have. Yet the fully examined 
representation can no longer maintain its presupposed self-consistency. “To become 
concrete […][ideas] should be explained […] and understood that what they really are, is 
unknown.”111 Hegel concludes his comments on the Socratic method by quoting Meno’s 
 
109 LHP I, 397-398. 
 
110 LHP I, 398. 
 
111 LHP I, 400 
Saad 62 
 
sense of astonishment in the face of Socratic perplexity, which leaves him numb like the 
sting of a ray.112 Philosophy must begin in this shocking way, realizing what is obvious to 
be utterly confounding, “must begin with a puzzle [Verwirrung] in order to bring about 
reflection [Nachdenken]; everything must be doubted, all presuppositions 
[Voraussetzungen] given up, to reach the truth as created through the Notion.”113  
4.2.2. Aporia in Theaetetus 
 Hegel maintains that each of the moments of thought are not fully separable, but 
contain each other as “moments of every properly logical content.”114 In tracing Plato’s 
thought as similarly constituted by moments, it is worth noting that the aporia is not 
confined to the early dialogues as a formal dramatic device introducing the character 
Socrates. Theaetetus is generally regarded to have been written after the middle period in 
which Plato moves past the pure aporia of the early dialogues and now presents the 
theory of forms, and yet in Theaetetus the aporetic form of the Socratic dialogues returns. 
This more mature aporia helps us comprehend the positive meaning of the aporia beyond 
its concluding comedic irony as presented in the early dialogues.  
 The relative maturity of this aporia can be seen in two respects. First, Socrates and 
his interlocutors attempt to define epistēmē, knowledge, rather than a particular virtue. 
While the earlier aporiae have all resulted from the presumption that a certain predication 
of X constitutes epistēmē of X, Socrates and his interlocutors now attempt to define 
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epistēmē itself. What has failed in the case of the particular virtues will certainly fail to 
offer a more general account of knowledge and end in perplexity. Yet in attempting to 
find a meta-definition of epistēmē the dialogue implicitly comments on the meaning of 
the aporiae in the earlier dialogues.  
 This oblique commentary on the meaning of the aporia is the second unique 
feature of the final aporia in Theaetetus. Socrates reframes the aporetic moment in terms 
of the art of intellectual midwifery he had introduced as his own at the state of the 
dialogue, stating that Theaetetus will henceforth give birth to better ideas even if the ones 
discussed were not adequate.115 This is the aporetic moment revisited by a mature Plato 
who has, however reluctantly, now introduced some positive theories. The aporia does 
not forebode the end of philosophy, but its beginning. Theaetetus has been given an 
education in the untruth of what is allegedly self-evident and taught the positive meaning 
of inquiring into what seems incapable of further articulation — an education in 
reflective self-consciousness. Hegel thus presents Socratic midwifery as the pivot 
towards reflection on the concrete universal.    
This concrete, as it is in natural consciousness without thinking of it, or 
universality immersed in matter, [Socrates] analyzed, so that through the 
separation of the concrete, he brought the universal contained therein to 
consciousness as universal […] The child, the uncultured man, lives in concrete 
individual ideas, but to the man who grows and educates himself, because he 
thereby goes back into himself as thinking, reflection becomes reflection on the 
universal and the permanent establishment of the same; and a freedom—formerly 
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 The concrete universal is already immanent in the tapestry of human experience 
on display in the agora, in the discourse of eager youths, pious frauds, and bumbling old 
men. The aporia is not a dead end but the wonder (to thaumazein) that is the beginning of 
philosophy.117 Socrates holds up a mirror to humanity, the mirror of thought replacing the 
mirror of nature. 
4.3. Plato’s moving aporia, modernity’s static presupposition 
 The etymology of aporia further confirms the fluid movement of Platonic thought. 
Moving up the divided line to the geometric abstraction of dianoia, thought appears 
prepared to surpass its dependence on outer images and define ethical concepts — the 
pious, the just, the good itself. However, in accordance with two pre-philosophical 
definitions of aporia, dianoia’s attempt to define the absolute ends up stuck in un-
passable (a-poros) paradoxes which it is without resource (a-poros) to resolve.118 The 
aporetic moment is the moment when thought has been left unequipped to reach the goal 
it intends. While this limitation frustrates Socrates’ interlocutors, Plato can only 
recognize this limitation as a limitation by having surpassed it.119 As Hegel comments on 
the a priori limitation of thought in established in Kantian philosophy, “something can be 
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known [gewußt], even felt to be a barrier, a lack only insofar as one has at the same time 
gone beyond it.”120  
 This extension of thought beyond its apparent limitations is also implicit in 
Socratic irony. The elenchus is only ironic to the extent that Socrates already has moved 
beyond the naïve attempt to predicate the absolute and now engages in a reflective form 
of thought which anticipates and accepts the aporetic moment. The aporia does not arise 
from dianoia itself, which uncritically accepts certain hypotheses as given and so does 
not recognize its own constraints. The sophists and mathematicians never arrived at an 
impassable aporia through their own efforts.  Only from the dialectical encounter of 
Socratic questioning challenged their doxai and disclosed their limitations. Thought has 
been shown to be limited, but only by another form of thought. 
 Hegel’s description of the self-contained freedom of Greek philosophy (with 
which I began this thesis)121 emerges mostly clearly in this seamless transition between 
naïve definition and reflective dialectic in the Platonic dialogues. Unable to recognize the 
understanding and its representational content as only the starting point of thought, the 
modern does not allow the movement of thought to fully develop itself. Instead of 
moving past representationalism, philosophy since Descartes has attempted to escape the 
aporetic moment by moving backward, by establishing a priori foundations which one-
sidedly settle the paradoxes wrought by the pure understanding. Thought must leap 
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forward over the chasm of aporia to secure its self-mediated independence, but modernity 
has only retreated. 
5. The Euthyphro dilemma 
 While Hegel’s presuppositional attitude can be traced through the history of 
modern philosophy, Plato’s aporia is direct and dramatic. It remains to integrate the two 
by considering how Hegel would account for a specific aporetic moment in the Platonic 
dialogues. 
 The Euthyphro dilemma supplies an aporia appropriate for a Hegelian 
reconsideration. In Euthyphro, Socrates asks the young priest Euthyphro to provide a 
definition of piety. Self-righteously prosecuting his own father for murder, Euthyphro 
first defines piety as doing exactly what he himself is doing, prosecuting the 
wrongdoer.122 Socrates replies that Euthyphro, clearly blinded by his own conceit, has 
only offered his own action as one “of many holy things [tōn pollōn hosiōn].” Socrates 
rather seeks the “form itself that makes all pious actions pious [auto to eidos hō panta ta 
hosia hosia]” so that he may judge actions by using this form “as a model 
[paradeigmati].” 123 Euthyphro offers the concrete particular when Socrates seeks the 
abstract model, the universal representation against which each individual instance can be 
judged. This use of eidos predates the middle theory of forms and belongs more to 
dianoia than to epistēmē. Thought has not reflected upon itself and so requires it an 
abstract paradeigma by which to judge the particular case against the general formula. 
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 After some further jostling with Socrates, Euthyphro then shifts the definition of 
piety to include not just the one pious deed he is performing, but whatever the all gods 
love.124 While this definition moves beyond the single case to the general rule, the 
general rule is problematically circular. It does not conform to the syntax of the 
judgement, as the predicate god-loved (theophilēs) does not determine why the pious is 
pious but only describes a secondary effect (pathos) of the pious.125 In dismantling this 
definition, Socrates opposes the primary cause of X being X, that because of which 
(dioti) something is what it is, against what something is only because it is externally 
affected to be so, a passive attribute. Seeking the universal determination as one from 
among the many, logic arranges these qualities as primary and secondary. The defining 
qualities are primary and causally necessary while the other qualities are only secondary 
and derivative. Being loved by the gods cannot be what makes the pious the pious. This 
state of being god-loved is only a secondary quality as it arises from an external reaction 
to a concept that must already exist on its own account. Socrates lays out several 
analogous cases and then proceeds to generalize, 
 Is what I want to say clear, Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that if anything 
 is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed 
 [gignetai] because it is something changed [hoti gignomenon], but rather it is 
 something changed [gignomenon] because it is being changed [hoti 
 gignetai] nor is it being affected [paschei] because it is something affected 
 [hoti paschon], but it is something affected [paschon] because it is being 
 affected [hoti paschei].126 
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Passive states of being are not primary but relative to those affecting them. A proper 
definition must be inherent in the term defined and not dependent on the activity of an 
external factor. With every definition hanging upon other definitions, which in turn 
depend on others and circle back to the original definition, thought would become the 
endless equation of empty tautologies.  
 This hollow circularity is the fullest expression of the abstract identity Hegel 
critiques as the basic presupposition the understanding, which equates subjects and 
predicates as complete in themselves, abstracting away their development in thought. 
Though the definition seems to posit a bare equivalence between the term defined and the 
definition, the term defined must be in some sense prior to the definition. Socrates here 
emphasizes that the concept must give rise to the definition and not vice versa. But while 
the understanding is rightly dissatisfied with circular definitions, it only attempts to 
overcome circularity through static identity. The flabbergasted Euthyphro says as much 
in response to the Euthyphro dilemma, lamenting that “whatever proposition we put 
forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it.”127 Taking the defining 
predicate as identical with the subject, the understanding aims at identity but can only 
frustrate the movement of thought in futile circularity.  
5.1. A Hegelian reciprocal response 
 The understanding renders the subject as the prior cause of the defining predicate. 
In a slight variation on Richard Robinson’s “What is X?” formula, Socrates here seeks to 
know “What is the Y because of which (hoti) X is X?”. As Socrates’ argument by 
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analogy in Euthyphro shows, no passive state can define the active concept — to do so is 
to only define the concept in terms of another external concept and not in itself. The 
problem of definition is thus analogous to the problem of the causality, in which the term 
defined must be the cause of its own defining predicate. In this interpretation of what it 
means for a definition to be auto kath’ auto, piety alone can give rise to its own 
definition. Piety cannot be piety only because of some external activity, like the love of 
the gods. To the understanding, the abstract universal paradeigma is that which causes 
the many particulars to exist in a certain determinable way. Yet the presupposition of 
such a cause distorts thought when it considers the whole, as a chain of causes must 
culminate in some final cause — God to the medieval theologian, autonomous 
subjectivity to the Kantian philosopher, the empirically discernable properties of matter 
to the natural scientist. However diverse these philosophies may be, they each are ready 
to dogmatically present a final cause to fulfill the understanding’s need for causal 
explanations.128 
 But Hegel shows that cause and effect is not the absolute relationship it is 
presupposed to be. Where Socrates here seeks the X that is because of Y, the Y can 
equally be shown to be because of the X. Even for the sensuous understanding cause and 
 
128 “To the same degree that the understanding is accustomed to resisting [the idea of 
]substantiality, it is, by contrast, at home with causality, i.e. the relationship of cause and effect. If 
construing a content in a necessary fashion is what matters, then reflection at the level of the understanding 
makes it its business to reduce that content to the relationship of causality above all. Now this relationship, 
to be sure, pertains to necessity, but it is only the one side in the process of necessity which is just as much 
this, to sublate the mediation contained in causality and demonstrate itself to be a simple relation-to-itself. 
If one does not move beyond causality as such, then one does not have it as it truly is, but instead as a finite 
causality, and the finitude of this relation then consists in the fact that cause and effect are firmly 
maintained in their difference.” EL §153, 227. 
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effect cannot be maintained in abstract opposition. “Even in a finite cause and its 
representation, this identity in regard to the content is at hand; the rain, the cause, and the 
wetness, the effect, are one and the same concretely existing water.”129 Causality shows 
itself to be a one-sided relationship which sublates itself into reciprocity, “eliminating the 
distinction between the determiner and the determined,” the priority of the term over its 
definition which gives rise to the Euthyphro dilemma. Richard Dien Winfield sees this as 
a crucial moment in Hegel’s logic in which “the logic of foundationalism eliminates 
itself, giving way to the logic of self-determination, where determiner and determined are 
one and the same.”130 
 The problematic circularity of abstract definition gives way to an intensively 
mediated relation between two mutually implicatory terms. The Euthyphro dilemma 
arises when the understanding attempts to define a concept which is inherently relational. 
Hegel describes piety as arising through the interplay of self and other in the dialectic of 
unhappy consciousness in the Phenomenology. Andacht directs thought towards the holy 
other (denkt an) as the unhappy consciousness attempts to negate itself in the egoless 
ritual of religious observation.131 Piety is an attitude of reverence to an exulted other, 
whether divine or familial, and so represents a difficult case for who will not permit any 
trace of the other in an auto kath’ auto definition.  
 
129 EL §153, 226. 
130 Winfield, 156. 
131 “Its thinking as such is no more than the discordant clang of ringing bells, or a cloud of warm 
incense, a kind of thinking in terms of music.” PM, 257-258. 
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 The dispute over piety in Euthyphro’s case arises from the competing claims of 
the divine and the paternal; a more dialectically direct Socrates could have presented 
Euthyphro with a counter-definition of piety as doing whatever one’s parents love. When 
the problem is reframed as the problem of defining the “in-itself” of concepts which 
necessarily implicate a relational other, the dilemma can be expanded to other 
relationships as well. Do friends love the same things because they are friends or are they 
friends because they love the same things? Are the popular celebrated because they are 
desirable or are they desirable because they are popular?  Do experts speak 
authoritatively because of the respect owed them or are they owed respect because they 
speak so authoritatively? The understanding takes personal qualities as existing prior to 
and separate from personal relationships. It stands to reason that friends are friends 
because they share the same interests, and yet people grow in their interests by having 
friends. It stands to reason that the popular are popular because they are desirable, and yet 
people are seen in their most desirable aspect because of their popularity. It stands to 
reason that experts are owed respect because they speak authoritatively, and yet they may 
speak authoritatively only insofar as they enjoy audiences who recognize them as experts.  
 In the contemplation of Geist, self-consciousness inverts the logical priority 
expected by the understanding. Presupposition gives way to a logic whose elements are 
reciprocal and dynamically two-sided. In piety we subordinate ourselves in an external 
devotion, but one that always mirrors inner conviction. Remembering the Platonic 
injunction to self-knowledge, we may further object to Euthyphro that the god-loved is 
indiscernible to whomever does not already love as a god loves — in the full self-
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awareness that loving and being loved is not an abstract attribute, but the substantial 
reciprocity which each recognizes, reflects, and rejuvenates the other.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this thesis I have shown the close correlation between Hegel's critique of the 
understanding and Plato's aporetic moment. In Hegel, the understanding attempts to 
abstract a generalized model from an externally given, objectified representation. In the 
early Platonic dialogues, Socrates interrogates the conventional ethical views of his 
interlocutors by encouraging his students to express them in generalized formulae. The 
modern philosophy of the understanding, alongside Socrates’ interlocutors, attempts to 
rigorously define ethical, social, and religious concepts. These attempts fail because the 
abstract form of thought is inadequate to the concrete content of human life. There is a 
critical divergence in the ancient and modern responses to this failure. Hegel reads the 
history of modern philosophy as only doubling down on the understanding by grounding 
it on various presuppositions. This leaves modern thought unfree and tethered down to a 
priori assumptions. In Plato, by contrast, the aporetic moment marks the end of a 
geometric philosophy of definitions and the start of the reflective dialectical moment 
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